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Series	Foreword
“Media determine our situation,” Friedrich Kittler infamously wrote 
in his Introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Although this 
dictum is certainly extreme— and media archaeology has been 
critiqued for being overly dramatic and focused on technological 
developments— it propels us to keep thinking about media as 
setting the terms for which we live, socialize, communicate, orga-
nize, do scholarship, et cetera. After all, as Kittler continued in his 
opening statement almost thirty years ago, our situation, “in spite 
or because” of media, “deserves a description.” What, then, are the 
terms— the limits, the conditions, the periods, the relations, the 
phrases— of media? And, what is the relationship between these 
terms and determination? This book series, In Search of Media, 
answers these questions by investigating the often elliptical “terms 
of media” under which users operate. That is, rather than produce 
a series of explanatory keyword- based texts to describe media 
practices, the goal is to understand the conditions (the “terms”) 
under which media is produced, as well as the ways in which media 
impacts and changes these terms.
Clearly, the rise of search engines has fostered the proliferation 
and predominance of keywords and terms. At the same time, it 
has changed the very nature of keywords, since now any word 
and pattern can become “key.” Even further, it has transformed 
the very process of learning, since search presumes that, (a) with 
the right phrase, any question can be answered and (b) that the 
answers lie within the database. The truth, in other words, is “in 
viii there.” The impact of search/media on knowledge, however, goes 
beyond search engines. Increasingly, disciplines— from sociology to 
economics, from the arts to literature— are in search of media as 
a way to revitalize their methods and objects of study. Our current 
media situation therefore seems to imply a new term, understood 
as temporal shifts of mediatic conditioning. Most broadly, then, this 
series asks: What are the terms or conditions of knowledge itself?
To answer this question, each book features interventions by 
two (or more) authors, whose approach to a term— to begin with: 
communication, pattern discrimination, markets, remain, machine— 
diverge and converge in surprising ways. By pairing up scholars 
from North America and Europe, this series also advances media 
theory by obviating the proverbial “ten year gap” that exists across 
language barriers due to the vagaries of translation and local 
academic customs. The series aims to provoke new descriptions, 
prescriptions, and hypotheses— to rethink and reimagine what 
media can and must do.
Introduction
Machine	 
Communication
Paula Bialski, Finn Brunton, 
and Mercedes Bunz
This book searches for an understanding of communication, in 
light of the fact that more communication than ever before is being 
mediated digitally by machines. To understand the full scope of 
what “to communicate” now means, it will curiously explore the 
complexity of the entities we are communicating to, with, and 
through to other entities. Looking not just at how we communicate 
with digital media but also at how digital devices and software 
communicate with us, to us, and to each other can more precisely 
outline the power (imagined or not) that computers and the people 
who take part in building our computers hold. By looking at various 
dimensions of communication in history and practice, this volume 
serves as an account of how digital media addresses its “subjects”; 
how alien and invisible the mediators we built have become; and 
how complex communication is now that we work with and interact 
with our machines. With this, the volume Communication takes up 
the main theme of the book series In Search of Media: it searches 
for the shift in the mediatic and technological conditioning of 
communication and aims to make this shift visible.
Digital media are not just filters but are “vehicles that carry and 
communicate meaning” (Peters 2012, 2). Because media carry, 
x relay, and sort information, they have the ability to meddle in our 
communication. Mediating is about meddling— and who meddles, 
what meddles, and how it/they meddle is key to understanding 
how digital communication functions. If communication does not 
unfold anymore between merely two (or more) conscious entities, 
yet rather includes an invisible third party, this can drastically shift 
what to communicate actually means. What (a set of programs, 
networking systems, or interfaces) or who (a team of developers) 
meddles in our communication is a crucial question for the techni-
cal realities of our societies today.
To understand the many modes and facets of this shift of commu-
nication, this book analyzes the communication of machines, ex-
perts, and aliens and turns to historic and contemporary engineers, 
designers, and users that are all taking part in how we humanly 
and nonhumanly communicate. For this, the volume’s chapters 
look at machine communication, although from three different 
perspectives: in chapter 1, Finn Brunton explores communication 
and digital technology by showing the alienlike dialogue between 
technical entities; in chapter 2, Mercedes Bunz looks at how digital 
technology, which now has even started to speak, is addressing 
us; and in chapter 3, Paula Bialski studies machine communication 
when turning to the social aspects of technical systems. Or, in other 
words, chapter 1 looks at the nonhuman communication between 
computers and the indirect communication happening in digital 
infrastructure, chapter 2 looks at how computers communicate to 
humans and examines the force of communication, and chapter 3 
looks at the actual creation of digital infrastructure and machine 
communication through a code review system.
With these three perspectives, the volume is bringing together 
three contrasting scholars: Brunton is a media theorist who has 
written about a multitude of media- related, historically rooted 
topics, including surveillance and obfuscation, as well as a cultural 
history of spam, in which he showed that it is not humans who 
are producing the majority of communication traffic. Bunz is a 
media and technologies scholar researching digital technology and 
xiphilosophy of technology who has published on artificial intelli-
gence, the internet of things, and algorithms, always questioning 
how those technical applications transform knowledge and, with 
it, questions of power. Bialski’s background sits between sociology 
and ethnography of media. In the past years, she conducted eth-
nography around the way new media fosters new forms of mobility 
and togetherness, how it transforms our understanding of space 
(location) and intimacy. In 2016, she started a fieldwork project in 
a large- scale mapping software company in Berlin. Her chapter in 
this volume therefore draws on her ongoing ethnographic project 
with these corporate software developers.
Introducing the chapters in more detail, one could say that in the 
first chapter, Brunton looks at the ways we communicate, directly 
and indirectly, with digital infrastructure. Pushing the analysis 
of the inhuman aspect of this infrastructure further, he turns to 
aspects of digital communications history, starting with early inter-
action design and discussions by J. C. R. Licklider and Robert Taylor 
about whether two tape recorders communicate when they play 
to each other. Brunton’s inquiry into nonhuman communication 
then brings up the problem of timekeeping in networks, ending 
with Google’s own timekeeping system, TrueTime, all of them 
showing that communication means much more than just sending 
and receiving— in a complex setup, they produce the contemporary 
now. Tracing inhuman communication further, Brunton points also 
to the problem of automated trolling, as most of the communica-
tion that is sent and received is inhuman anyway. Following the 
hypothesis that we are in a process of building deeply inhuman 
architectures and systems on a vast scale, Brunton finally flips 
his approach by turning to historic projects of extraterrestrial 
communication in analogy to our current situation, aiming to open 
dimensions of analysis that might otherwise escape us.
Not far from Brunton’s approach, the second chapter, authored by 
Bunz, also traces nonhuman communication by turning to the force 
that unfolds in digital communication. Like Brunton, Bunz is shifting 
the perspective on communication away from an anthropocentric 
xii or anthropomorphic approach. Starting with the observation that 
a certain force has always been a theme in theories of communi-
cation, she aims to identify the particular aspect of this force for 
digital technology by asking, How is digital technology addressing 
us? When studying communication, Bunz thus mirrors Brunton’s 
approach, although she is turning it in the other direction: instead 
of looking toward and into digital communication systems, she 
looks at how digital communication systems are approaching us, 
thereby drawing on Althusser’s theory of interpellation. Turning 
to the historic events in digital design, such as the introduction of 
Apple’s iPad in 2010, by analyzing digital brand communication 
reliance on little animals as mascots and by bringing to the fore the 
shift of historical storytelling through Google’s Doodles, she shows 
that digital interfaces are addressing us as very young children. 
This has not necessarily to be read negatively, as it also calls on 
experimental– operational knowledge, which can be traced to the 
early history of graphical user interfaces and the influence of child 
psychologist Jean Piaget on computer scientists, especially on Sey-
mour Papert and Alan Kay. Like Brunton’s, Bunz’s chapter also then 
turns in a very different direction: after following the question after 
the force of digital communication to its paradigm of infantilization, 
she becomes interested in the paradigm itself and how it refrains 
from following a well- behaved dialectical thinking typical for the 
nonhuman logic of technology— it is manipulating us at the same 
time as it is empowering us.
Finally, Bialski’s chapter offers a rich ethnographic case study that, 
much like Bunz and Brunton do, explores communication with 
as well as through technology. After spending nearly two years 
at a large corporate software company in Berlin, she looks at 
software developers at work— specifically the way they review one 
another’s lines of code through a standardized, mandatory “code 
review system.” This system, while being mechanic and seemingly 
mundane, is also a highly variable communicative process because 
of the culture of communication that develops around it. Here 
she shows how technical systems emerge out of both human 
xiiiand machine communication. Through her chapter, she draws on 
examples of software developers at work— communicating with 
one another and with their machines, and waiting (and relying) on 
their machines to “communicate” with other machines. Through 
this, she analyzes how a technical system structures cooperation 
and how standards of communication develop. By looking at 
the idiosyncrasies of human– human as well as human– machine 
communication, she aims to provide a grounded example of the 
multifaceted nature of communication in digital cultures.
What unifies all three approaches in this volume is that all chapters 
aim to show that there has been a shift in our communication 
toward an interaction with or among machines, which comes across 
more strongly as the three approaches cover very separate ground. 
Brunton carefully underlines the “opportunity to consider how we 
engage with machines and how machines engage with each other”; 
Bunz explores how “machines seem to engage with us ”; and Bialski 
shows that there is a communicative interrelationship between the 
compilers, databases, processors, memory, servers, “clouds,” and 
their programmers, through the infrastructure within which both 
the programmers and the machines function. By ethnographically, 
historically, and theoretically exploring the nonhuman part in 
communication, by turning to machine communication, this small 
volume hopes to contribute to existing theories of communication.
Reference
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tion. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

[ 1 ]
Hello	from	Earth
Finn Brunton
Human beings write a great deal about the essence of matter. It 
would be nice for matter to begin to write about the human mind.
— Lichtenberg
Do	Two	Tape	Recorders	Communicate?
J. C. R. Licklider and Robert Taylor coauthored a landmark paper in 
1968: “The Computer as a Communication Device.” It was a major 
public step in shifting the understanding of what computers are for: 
from massive specialized calculators to communications platforms 
for the interaction of many users augmented by computation. It 
is part of the same cultural and technological moment as Douglas 
Engelbart’s Mother of All Demos, a theatrical happening (part tech-
nology showcase, part live science fiction film) at the 1968 Fall Joint 
Computer Conference that displayed mice, outliners, real- time doc-
ument collaboration and word processing, the nuances of linked 
documents, and other hallmarks of interactive and interpersonal 
computing (Bardini 2000, 138– 42). (It’s part of the same long event 
of inventing interaction that included Kay, Papert, and Piaget, so 
elegantly chronicled and analyzed by my colleague Mercedes Bunz 
in chapter 2 of this book.) Like Engelbart’s showcase, Licklider and 
2 Taylor’s article was only partially about the technology itself— about 
the metal, glass, and code: it was also a vehicle for communicating 
a feeling.
With a background in experimental psychology, Licklider was 
always conscious of the human in the newly emerging loop that En-
gelbart (1962, 2) called the “whole system” of people and machines. 
Licklider (1988, 30) documented his thought process, folding 
himself in as an experimental subject, a test pilot, one of the first 
people to be sitting at the computer console “four or five hours a 
day.” He wrote about the feeling of hitting the “brain– desk barrier,” 
assimilating the new assembly of information pulled together and 
presented by this networked library- computer (Licklider 1965, 102). 
He talked about the “motivational trap” of a cunningly built interac-
tive terminal, drawing you deep into the structure of a problem or 
a concept (Greenberger 1962, 208). “This is going to revolutionize 
how people think,” he repeated (Licklider 1988, 29). Not individual 
people, either, but groups, institutions, communities: “a flow of 
metal and ideas and of flexibility and change,” he wrote, in a single 
phrase that captures the poetic thrill of engineering not a particular 
technology but the overarching “system system” (Licklider 1963, 
628). Forget processing payroll or running Navier– Stokes equa-
tions: this was a change to human work, in the deepest sense, both 
individually and collectively. Engelbart called it “augmentation”; 
Licklider called it “symbiosis.” “The Computer as a Communication 
Device” was a path from new communication to new forms of 
community, sharing with “all the members of all the communities 
the programs and data resources of the entire super community” 
(Licklider and Taylor 1968, 32).
To make this case, in 1968, Licklider and Taylor first had to clarify 
a term: “A communications engineer thinks of communicating as 
transferring information from one point to another in codes and 
signals.” That’s not what they meant by “communication.” They 
were trying to get at something else: “our emphasis on people is 
deliberate” (21).
3What, then, did they mean by “communication”?
“To communicate,” they wrote, “is more than to send and to re-
ceive. Do two tape recorders communicate when they play to each 
other and record from each other? Not really— not in our sense. We 
believe that communicators have to do something nontrivial with 
the information they send and receive” (Licklider and Taylor 1968, 
21). They talked about “the richness of living information.” About 
being “active participants” whose “minds interact,” about “creative 
aspects” that “transcend” the transmission of information. What 
this turned out to mean for them, in practice, is using computers 
to produce models that people can manipulate in real time over 
the network. By “communication,” they meant the comparison of 
mental models.
This may not seem like much after all the talk of transcendent 
interacting minds, but Licklider and Taylor were dealing with the 
assumptions of a particular audience schooled in Claude Shannon’s 
information theory, where “communication” can indeed be defined 
down to the transmission of information between senders and 
receivers over channels. By emphasizing the role of interacting 
humans in the use of computers, they were taking up a novel and 
potent idea. Licklider and Taylor were trying to counteract the 
model of communication- as- information- transmission to make a 
case for time- sharing and better user interfaces. They drew strate-
gically on the deep resonant legacy of the word communication. But 
where does this powerful resonance come from— and what does it 
actually mean to communicate?
Shannon, approaching it as a telecommunications engineering 
problem, simplified communication to information: any exchange 
can be understood quantitatively in terms of entropy and probabil-
ity, in transmissions between senders and receivers over variably 
noisy channels, and thus the coding, compression, and capacity 
of channels can be designed appropriately. Warren Weaver, 
who introduced, popularized, and expanded on Shannon’s work, 
wrote in the introduction to the landmark Mathematical Theory of 
4 Communication, “The word communication will be used here in a 
very broad sense to include all of the procedures by which one 
mind may affect another. This, of course, involves not only written 
and oral speech, but also music, the pictorial arts, the theater, 
the ballet, and in fact all human behavior” (Shannon and Weaver 
1949, 3). Weaver was making the classic cybernetic rhetorical 
move, listing a whole family of seemingly disparate things all 
linked together by the power of the theory: all can be understood 
informationally, starting from a minimal state with no particular 
content beyond the probability of any given bit.
If we squint a little, this approach is similar to very different 
areas of media and communications studies (each answering 
the question, as Bunz puts it, of the “force” at work in any act of 
communication beyond what is conveyed). McLuhan, amid all his 
Joycean hubbub, proposed a model of media that is not dissimilar: 
the actual content of a book, a movie, a TV show, is more or less 
a distraction from the medium itself, which is what really com-
municates. The medium shapes linear print minds who sort the 
world into taxonomic ontologies, and it shapes “cool” tactile global 
villagers who listen into the acoustic space of broadcast for distant 
cultural thunder. The content is not what we should be reading if 
we want to understand what’s going on. McLuhan was the mentor 
and inspiration to USCO, a new media arts collective devoted 
to evoking the new consciousness theoretically made available 
through the immersive experience of electronic media. They built 
light installations and optical meditation machines and environ-
ments like The World, a colossal project in an airplane hangar in 
Garden City with eighteen slide projectors controlled by a repur-
posed IBM mainframe, 16mm film projection, and cutting- edge 
real- time analog video (Kuo 2008, 136). McLuhan spent some time 
in person with USCO, and Gerd Stern and Michael Callahan once 
had to drive him to the airport from the University of Rochester, 
in October 1964. McLuhan was getting into one of those now- rare 
prop planes with a stairwell in the tail. “I remember,” recalls Cal-
lahan, “Marshall walking up the stairs and us standing below and 
5seeing him disappear into the plane. But then we saw his legs, his 
feet came back a few steps, and he leaned out and said, ‘Disregard 
the content and concentrate upon the effect’ ” (Kuo 2008, 133).
Disregard the content: in McLuhan’s analysis, to get at what is 
happening in the act of communication, we can deliberately 
ignore whatever is being communicated, which is generally a mere 
epiphenomenon of the event of a particular medium, whether 
movable type or TV. His famously odd remark about the electric 
light— that it’s a medium, the only medium, that has form but no 
content— makes sense in the context of his argument: electric 
light carries no information of its own, beyond off and on, but its 
presence changes how we live and how we think, “the change of 
scale or pace or pattern that it introduces,” in ways that escape our 
observation precisely because we focus on what the light falls on, 
or what the newspaper article is about (McLuhan 1994, 8).
Similarly, in a more nuanced approach, JoAnne Yates (1989) 
and Cornelia Vismann (2008) understand how communications 
systems— particularly the tools of bureaucracy and management, 
files, forms, and paperwork— interpellate people, calling them 
to account and putting them into all kinds of arrangements and 
subject relationships. It’s not just the policeman Bunz describes, 
hailing us in the street, but also the citation he issues and the 
paperwork we must fill out. The preset fields, systems of identifiers, 
and needle- sort card files order us, in both senses of the word, and 
do so in their structure and not just their written content in ways 
that exceed the kind of interpretative tools we’ve developed. Pro-
cess generated, the universe of memos, forms, circulars, manuals, 
reports, and tables assembled into “control through communica-
tion” constituted a coordination mechanism that used words in 
enormous volume to increase efficiency across firms. The whole 
tool kit developed for reading and interpreting written media— 
hermeneutic approaches, textual analysis, and criticism— falters in 
the face of the most quantitatively significant written modes that 
shape our lives: bureaucratic and legal documents and the boxes, 
cabinets, shelves, and pallets of paperwork.
6 Vismann draws on Friedrich Kittler, who most purely exemplifies 
this strategy of getting to the heart of “communication” and 
“media” by subtracting what naively seems to be the most import-
ant part— the subjective, interpersonal content, the experience of 
communicating. Kittler (1990, 370) builds directly on his reading of 
Shannon’s work, with the humans on either end of the line merely 
distractions, atavistic holdouts whose fixation on meanings and 
inner experience keeps us from seeing the operation of the system 
of communication itself:
An elementary datum is the fact that literature (whatever 
else it might mean to readers) processes, stores, and 
transmits data, and that such operations in the age- old 
medium of the alphabet have the same technical pos-
itivity as they do in computers. . . . What remains to be 
distinguished, therefore, are not emotional dispositions 
but systems.
That parenthetical, with its casual dismissal of most of what we 
might think literature involves, has the chilling mildness of HAL 
9000 locking the human out of the ship in 2001: A Space Odyssey. 
Kittler’s move in the media theory of his time was not simply to 
apply ideas from Shannon, Turing, and sound and image repro-
duction technologies to get new insights into media as such but to 
read backward from these developments. It’s not that communica-
tions media are now different. They have always “determine[d] our 
situation,” in his famous phrase, from flowing humanist– Romantic 
handwriting and magic lanterns to ancient Greek music and mathe-
matics (Kittler 1999, xxxix). (In this, he inverts McLuhan’s other 
key tenet— that media are “the extensions of man,” expanding 
and externalizing our bodies and senses— by making humans the 
extensions of media.) Depersonalized mechanical and electronic 
media just make that determining power more obvious.
If we accept Kittler’s (2010) argument, then Weaver is not wrong to 
write that the mathematical theory of communication can apply 
to “in fact all human behavior.” With that theory in mind, Kittler 
7asserts, we can give a better (truer, more accurate, more useful) ac-
count of media than, for instance, “literary scholars” with a “trivial, 
content- based approach to media” (31). “Let us therefore,” Kittler 
writes, “forget humans, language, and sense in order to move on to 
the particulars of Shannon’s five elements and functions instead” 
(44). (It must be said here that Shannon himself, a humble and 
clear- eyed scientist, distrusted the hyping of his theory, even within 
the scientific and engineering community: “It has perhaps bal-
looned to an importance beyond its actual accomplishments,” he 
wrote in a 1956 editorial. “Seldom do more than a few of nature’s 
secrets give way at one time” [3].)
Kittler read Shannon carefully and came out with a model arguing 
that we miss the main event of communication, the actual opera-
tion of the network of discourse, if we are distracted from close at-
tention to the storage and transmission of data by people’s alleged 
inner lives and subjectivity. Licklider, who also read Shannon very 
carefully (as well as knowing him personally), came to precisely 
the opposite conclusion: “A communications engineer thinks of 
communicating as transferring information from one point to 
another in codes and signals,” he wrote with Taylor. The danger 
lay in having too shallow, too depersonalized, an understanding of 
communication. Cutting the humans out of the loop was a design 
problem, producing models of computer networking that couldn’t 
enrich human thinking. Licklider was getting at what Engelbart, in 
1962, called communication technologies as “a way of life”:
We refer to a way of life in an integrated domain where 
hunches, cut- and- try, intangibles, and the human “feel 
for a situation” usefully coexist with powerful concepts, 
streamlined technology and notation, sophisticated meth-
ods, and high- powered electronic aids. (1)
“Do two tape recorders communicate when they play to each 
other and record from each other?” No, said Licklider and Taylor: 
the communicators have to do something with the information 
they send and receive— something nontrivial, they write, in the 
8 mathematical sense of a trivial proof being easy, obvious, produc-
tive of a shallow truth.
Again, not to make too much of semantics, but notice the clashing 
“trivialities” here: for Kittler, the content- based, human- centric ap-
proach is a “trivial” one, whereas for Licklider and Taylor, the mere 
transmission of signals is the trivial part; the “nontrivial” happens 
somewhere between the interface, the computer, the human mind, 
and the interpersonal community of collaborators.
What I want to argue for here is a third position that doesn’t 
supersede the prior work but builds on it. It starts not from people 
nor from media in general but from computing in particular. In this, 
my argument supplements studies of digital formats and interfaces 
(e.g., Sterne 2012; Bardini 2000; Bunz, chapter 2), protocols (e.g., 
Galloway 2004; Bratton 2016), and infrastructures (e.g., Starosielski 
2015; Edwards 2003; Sandvig 2013)— but it comes to the problem 
of understanding the effect of digital networks on communication 
by a different route and with a different destination. I will demon-
strate that the concept of trivial or nontrivial communication has 
become much more ambiguous and complex to discuss in the thir-
ty years since Kittler and the fifty years since Licklider and Taylor’s 
foundational work. I will make the case for this position in three 
parts: first, by outlining the hybrid, social– technological complexity 
of the seemingly simple matter of keeping time among networked 
computers; second, by discussing the limited role played by 
humans in the communications taking place over the internet 
and associated technologies; and finally, by presenting the history 
of formats for communication with alien intelligence as offering 
useful analogies to our situation. In a mirror image of Bunz’s essay, 
I assert that we can productively reimagine what we are talking to 
when communicating with digital systems and considering their 
communications with us. This argument does not push humans 
to the margin, after Kittler— as vacuous metabolic vehicles across 
which discourse networks transact, like the parasitic typewriters 
in a William Burroughs story— but neither does it put them at the 
center of the story, as Licklider and Taylor do. I will start by asking 
9Licklider and Taylor’s original question again: Do two tape recorders 
communicate?
Mutually Suspicious Clocks
Much of what structures contemporary networked life and digital 
media is “tape recorders” talking to each other, understood as var-
ious forms of addressable data storage, processing, and retrieval. 
The most active areas of current digital communication— analyzed 
qualitatively or quantitatively— are almost entirely tape recorders 
in networks of exchanges, for which the humans are only of third- 
or fourth- order consequence. (This is another way of phrasing the 
“layers” and stacks that Bunz describes in detail when we look at 
digital media in particular.) These are areas where the idea of “trivi-
ality” becomes very tricky.
Consider the problem of the clock.
The clock is the very model of dehumanized Machine Age op-
erations, illustrated by the people who embraced it as the new 
model of work and life, like Alexei Gastev’s ultra- Taylorist institutes 
incorporating clock rhythm into the cyclogram- trained, wordless 
operation of machine shop labor coordinated by the “electronic 
beeps of a machine” or Louis Aragon’s perfect Modernist line: “In 
my left pocket I carry a remarkably accurate self- portrait: a watch in 
burnished steel. It speaks, marks time and understands none of it” 
(Stites 1989, 154; Ades 2006, 181). What could be more trivial than 
the working of a clock?
Licklider was one of the main motors, with Robert Fano and others 
at MIT, of the Compatible Time- Sharing System (CTSS), a multiuser 
computing project with remote terminals connected to a central 
mainframe. Licklider and Fano wanted computing to feel like an 
invisible resource, always on, a daily utility like electricity or water. 
(One of their great triumphs was the complaints they would receive 
whenever the system was down— why can’t I get access right now? 
What the hell’s going on?— because that meant the users were 
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[Lee and Rosin 1992, 26].) The tape recorders were there in CTSS, 
literally: banks of IBM 729 magnetic tape drives, which you can 
watch spinning back and forth through their address space over 
the shoulders of scientists being interviewed on television in the 
1960s. Licklider, Fano, and the tape recorders were supporting the 
epitome of the symbiosis- and- augmentation computers- helping- 
humans- communicate model.
They had a timing problem. The machines didn’t have clocks, so 
if you hit a glitch or a loop, you locked up the whole machine for 
everybody, and there was no mechanism that could time stamp 
files or kill a process after a few seconds. To resolve this, they fig-
ured out how to hook up a basic time- of- day clock to the machine 
through the printer port (Waldrop 2001, 234). This seems like the 
very definition of trivial communication: a simple clock to regulate 
all those dumb tape recorders, coordinating the most basic form of 
communication— a statement of the immediate present moment— 
to aid the nontrivial communication of time- sharing computer 
network users.
Jump forward to September 1985, to a document called the 
Request for Comments (RFC) 956, one in the series of coordinating 
memos for the architects and committees creating the internet 
and related technologies— the long- term result of CTSS and other 
experiments. “The recent interest within the Internet community 
in determining accurate time from a set of mutually suspicious 
network clocks has been prompted by several occasions in which 
gross errors were found in usually reliable, highly accurate clock 
servers after seasonal thunderstorms which disrupted their 
primary power supply” (Mills 1985, 1). Once you start networking 
the machines together, the problems of keeping time become far 
more complex. How do you know which messages come first? 
What’s the order in the queue? How do you make sure data aren’t 
being resent unnecessarily? (The software consultant Mathias 
Verraes [2015] captured it with a sardonic joke: “There are only two 
11hard problems in distributed systems: 2. Exactly- once delivery 1. 
Guaranteed order of messages 2. Exactly- once delivery.”)
It’s one thing to have a master clock regulating all the activities, like 
the Taylorist tick of scientifically managed factory labor waiting for 
the shift whistle. This is the clock as understood by Lewis Mumford, 
the prototype of all other industrial machines and the coordinating 
center of the humans– tools– processes megamachine, building 
pyramids and cranking out Model Ts. Network clocks are a very dif-
ferent class of machine. They have to account for transmission lag 
and mechanical failures and the behavior of many other “mutually 
suspicious” clocks. The clock protocols have to compensate for the 
effects of seasons and weather on parts of the network.
The clock is now so big that it has to contain and compensate for 
Earth’s atmosphere, because it interferes with the accuracy of the 
clock. John Durham Peters (2015) has discussed elemental forms 
as media; Jussi Parikka (2015) has argued for studying the geolog-
ical histories embedded in and sometimes expressed by media 
systems. We don’t even have to go as far as artworks or solar 
energy captured in trees as paper pulp to make their case with 
this example: lightning will hit high- tension lines in late summer 
thunderstorms and disrupt the overall temporal picture for the net-
work, so tools are developed to correct for that. At this point, we’re 
still below the level of triviality assigned to tape recorders that “play 
to each other and record from each other”: these are still just the 
clocks that enabled the tape recorders to play back and forth in an 
orderly fashion thirty years ago.
As I write this, the current situation is far more complex. It’s global, 
operating across diverse media from undersea fiber- optic cables 
to microwave relays, satellites, cellular- band radio, and copper 
twisted pair. It faces signal delays and lag and clock drift from 
machine to machine (which is affected by the amount of work the 
machine is doing, and even by heat). To work out the time, it will 
take a signal that has been time stamped in one location to reach 
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(whose scale Bunz describes in the context of our overreliance on 
the voice of navigation instructions). GPS, being satellite based, 
has to compensate for relativistic problems— the way time passes 
differently outside of Earth’s gravity well. The clock must indirectly 
incorporate not only the atmosphere but the shape of Earth itself 
as the “geoid,” the subtle undulations of the gravitational field, ex-
pressible as a hypothetical ocean surface and perturbing satellites 
in and out of their true paths.
All of this work to define the machine’s time on the network has 
to function in the context of geopolitics and political economy as 
expressed in one of their purest forms: time zones. Knowing the 
time goes well beyond signaling, measuring, and geodesy— and 
not just for the benefit of the human glancing at her phone’s lock 
screen but for automatically time stamping and logging events, 
correlating them across borders, accurately representing the hour 
in the past and the future, and providing data that can account 
for the national solar time at any given place. Will people be at 
work? When should alarms be set? Will the stock market be open? 
Should lights be on or off? There are clock systems particular to 
computing, like UNIX time, used by many file formats and operat-
ing systems, incrementing one second per second since 00:00:00 
UTC, January 1, 1970— at this exact moment, 1,456,328,317. (“UTC” 
is the Coordinated Universal Time standard, mean solar time at 0º, 
used in aviation, weather forecasting, many scientific applications, 
and the Network Time Protocol, keeping computer clocks in synch.) 
On top of these systems runs the stack of Westphalian assertions 
of identity and human chronotypes concerned with hunger, work, 
and sleep.
The time zone system can be read as an ongoing, minimalist 
history of modernity: territorial struggles, global trade, new 
technologies and forms of work, all embedded as brief lines 
in computer databases like the “tz” or “zoneinfo” database in 
UNIX- based systems (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 2016). 
Samoa decided to move across the international dateline to be 
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China) and lost a day in 2011 doing so; those countries had become 
more important than the ships from San Francisco had once been. 
Nepal is deliberately fifteen minutes ahead of India; Indiana has a 
complex, politically fraught relationship with U.S. Daylight Savings 
Time (itself a matter of issues between agricultural, industrial, and 
white- collar labor) that puts some counties in the state an hour 
ahead of others. China went from five time zones to one in 1949, a 
potent tool for centralization and unity— all the way to the Xinjiang 
Region is theoretically on Beijing Standard, though Uyghurs also 
use and maintain their own time. Crimea’s interim government 
switched to Moscow Standard Time in late March 2014, a gesture 
of political significance on par with Spain’s adoption of Central 
European Time in 1940, chronometrically cementing Franco’s 
alliance with Hitler (and stranding Spain, much of which lies to the 
west of Greenwich, in a time zone that creates its own daily rhythm 
of “late” sunrises and sunsets).
All of this and more must be automatically accounted for by the 
network’s clocks, expressed as code with a laconic history of con-
flicts, alliances, powerful markets, and subaltern peoples. The clock 
has become a kind of political appliance, having to incorporate all 
this complex history to function properly:
Rule Libya 1997 only - Oct 4 0:00 0 - 
Rule Libya 2013 only - Mar lastFri 1:00 1:00 S
Zone Europe/Simferopol 2:00 EU EE%sT 2014 Mar 30 2:00 
4:00 - MSK 2014 Oct 26 2:00s
Zone Asia/Jerusalem 2:20:54 - LMT 1880 2:20:40 - JMT 
1918 # Jerusalem Mean Time? 2:00 Zion I%sT
Consider our clock at this point. To coordinate interactions be-
tween “tape recorders” across the network— all those different 
points to and from which data are sent, requested, retrieved— it di-
rectly and indirectly incorporates millions of global clocks with their 
various skews and drifts, in the political governance patchwork of 
dozens of time zones on which both humans and clock- triggered 
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be congested or completely down and that need to be routed 
around, which changes the timing on transmissions, with times 
synchronized over radio and transoceanic cables sunk in pelagic 
sediment, requested from atomic clocks with reference to satellites 
and quartz crystals— themselves synched by human labor, with 
gatherings to monitor the “leap second” transition, including the 
influence of nothing less than space- time itself. The business of 
efficiently managing message queues and flows carries us through 
the step- by- step of pragmatic engineering decisions into the foun-
dations of time and light.
We can go still one step further before returning to the question 
of the relative triviality of communications: into the now of this 
vast timekeeping process. One of Google’s greatest achievements 
is a distributed database called “Spanner.” Spanner “shards” data 
over hundreds of data centers across the planet, maintaining 
consistency on a global scale. Thus users can see the same text 
in a collaborative online document; search results can be appro-
priately ranked, mail sent and received, ads priced and displayed, 
planetwide and without internal contradictions (Corbett et al. 
2012). Data repeatedly requested can be copied to a shard closer 
to the location of the request, to lower the latency, delivering the 
next request faster; something can happen on a phone in Kazakh-
stan, a server in Seoul, and a laptop in Cape Town, simultaneously 
(or as close to simultaneous as the human mind is capable of 
observing unassisted), and be reconciled and coordinated; failure 
of the system in one place is compensated for in another before 
any human intervention is necessary. To make this possible, Goo-
gle’s engineers were obligated to develop their own timekeeping 
system, TrueTime, which uses “time master machines” in each data 
center, cross- referencing GPS with their own atomic clocks; those 
latter units have the rather awe- inspiring name of “Armageddon 
masters.” Even this has uncertainty for which it must compensate, 
though: TrueTime, constantly correcting itself to account for 
15drift, uncertainty, and slew, has a real “now” of between one and 
fourteen milliseconds long.
It does not detract from the achievement of Spanner and the True-
Time system to point this out; I bring it up to make clear that there 
is nothing simple, nothing trivial about the act of tracking time for 
the tape recorders. That is precisely what is happening here: to 
enable the coordination of the storage, transmission, and retrieval 
of data, prior to and independent of any encounter with humans, 
we have built a system that includes late summer storms, the 
curvature of space- time, and a new, specialized, continuous now, 
regulated by an arrangement called “Paxos leader lease protocol” 
(to whom should we listen, all of us tape recorders, when updating 
the state of our data?). It is a wonder of engineering not least 
because it vanishes into the background— because we are unaware 
of the labor of producing now. Jimena Canales (2009) has captured 
the emergence of another new now at the turn of the nineteenth 
century, a world on the threshold of a tenth of a second and the 
influence of this new now in domains ranging from experimental 
psychology and the exact sciences to semiotics and the birth of 
photography and movies. It was a critical chapter in the story of 
“measuring, mastering, and disenchanting” in the production of the 
modern age (207). There was nothing trivial about either the tools 
or the implications of pushing “now” past a decisecond. Likewise, 
creating a simultaneous, global, networked now of between one 
and fourteen milliseconds has implications that cut across media, 
society, and applied science: it sets up the framework within which 
what Wendy Chun (2008, 149) calls the “enduring ephemeral” 
of “constantly disseminated and regenerated digital content” is 
experienced, the cultural signature of our age.
In other words, Licklider and Taylor’s title “The Computer as a 
Communication Device” was perfectly accurate, but in the opposite 
sense: the computer is a communication device, and the commu-
nicators are doing something nontrivial with the information they 
send and receive. It’s just that very, very few of the communicators 
are people.
16 Telephones	Have	Conversations
After we have given so much attention to the problems of net-
worked time and timing, of maintaining state and keeping data syn-
chronized across the breadth of the network, it seems logical that 
we would, at last, turn to the humans who are producing the traffic. 
All that timekeeping— itself not really communicative, except in the 
most minimal sense— is the service, after all, of human– human 
and human– machine interactions. What of the “active participants” 
with “minds interacting” for whom this whole system was to serve 
as the platform? It is not mere contrarianism to say that quanti-
tatively and— I argue— increasingly qualitatively, human activities 
are of less and less significance. In this, I seek not to contradict 
but to complement Bunz’s essay, which describes the ambiguities 
(empowering or patronizing?) in how digital technologies talk to 
us as children. As actual communication on present networks 
moves away from anthropocentric models, it shifts the “situation” 
she describes and with it the meaning of those infantilizing forms 
of interface addressed to us humans. Her study of those modes 
of interface and address frees me to turn to the nonhuman side 
of the situation (to paraphrase Licklider and Taylor, my emphasis 
on machines is deliberate). I will approach this in three parts: that 
humans are not producing as much of the communicative traffic as 
we may think; that, in some areas, our activity is not easily distin-
guished from the activity of machines; and that our communicative 
activity often has its greatest effect in the aggregate, as data rather 
than as the expressions of individuals.
First, humans are not producing all of the traffic or even, in some 
cases, the majority. There’s spam in volumes that dwarfs human– 
human email exchanges, very little of which human readers 
encounter: it is generated using templates with “per- message poly-
morphism” by botnets running on malware- infected computers, 
sent in million- message batches to automated filtering systems— 
that is, systems trying to identify human text in an arms race with 
systems that are not trying to imitate humans but to model what 
the filters think human behavior is (Brunton 2013, 182). On bad 
17days on the network, upward of 80 percent of all the email sent 
is spam (again, only a tiny portion of which will ever meet human 
eyes). This is of a piece with anywhere on the network that human 
attention pools and aggregates.
Google, maintaining an index of links between sites as a picture 
of what people consider most important or notable for any given 
query, has to contend with bot- driven posting activity on social 
media, pirated wikis, and in the comments everywhere. “Great 
post, really interesting” writes a commenter, with “interesting” 
linking to a client’s site or an affiliate scam or a porn- clip landing 
page. The system of Private Blog Networks has been built solely to 
establish the appearance of a thriving human community where 
none exists. Twitter and other social networks regularly have to 
conduct sweeps to purge the bot accounts from their ranks (bots 
that follow paying users in packs of thousands to make them 
look important and popular). The same is true of buying likes on 
Facebook or YouTube, listens on SoundCloud, clicks on ads, and 
so on. In a bankable version of Goodhart’s law (“When a measure 
becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”— or, “What gets 
evaluated, gets gamed”), any metric meant to describe human 
interest, esteem, or attention more generally will produce purpose- 
built nonhumans who will take it over for pay (Goodhart 1981, 116). 
It’s the most perverse version of Licklider’s goal of “man– machine 
symbiosis,” because the bots and the business models they repre-
sent don’t want to overwhelm the system or ruin the arrangement. 
Sometimes, in some corners of the internet, on poorly secured fora 
where bots can set up accounts unchecked, you can experience 
a Philip K. Dick– like moment of existential vertigo: is anyone here 
human other than me?
The second point follows from the second clause of that question. 
“Other than me”: it may not matter if I or my program is writing, as 
human and machine communication activities can be indistinguish-
able in many domains. One of the most telling of the Snowden 
disclosures was the revelation of the research going into what is 
called “information- operations” work, “influence or disruption,” in 
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VOICE in the United States (Greenwald 2014). The goal is to “Deny/
Disrupt/Degrade/Deceive” online conversations, communities, and 
movements through the injection of massive numbers of generat-
ed “personas” that can engage in online social activity (Fielding and 
Cobain 2011). They can shift sentiments, quietly spread propagan-
da, amplify messages, give the impression of trending or significant 
topics, game online polls, or simply flood a conversation that would 
otherwise be potentially significant with irrelevancies, noise, and 
derailing fight starting.
These personas may not necessarily be artificial; they may or may 
not be conversation engines running on a deep learning feature 
set. There may indeed be people on the keyboard at the other 
end— as in the case of Vladimir Putin’s troll factory in St. Peters-
burg, with coordinated teams at work manipulating conversations 
about Ukraine and Syria, or gamergate trolls using a mix of bots 
and their own inimitable human capacity for bullying, harassment, 
threats, and time- wasting interference to drive women out of 
gaming and off the internet (Sindelar 2014). There are many 
significant things to consider about the consequences for political 
discourse and how we conceive of a public sphere that includes 
bot- saturated social networks, but the salient point is that, for the 
practical purpose of excluding messages or kicking bots off the 
platform, it doesn’t matter if a human or a machine is communi-
cating. Software development seeks to make them functionally 
indistinguishable. (Analyzing a study of bots on the side of Labour 
in the United Kingdom revealed that rules identifying bots were 
often counting particularly fervid human supporters [Bartlett 
2017].) The ultimate goal still involves humans, however indirectly: 
to polarize their political perspectives, to waste their time, to create 
an illusion of majority belief, to bury something and keep them 
from seeing it. The humans matter as an end result, but not as the 
means. Whether in a messaging app, on the help desk, or attacking 
an unpopular Twitter user, these systems are meant to erase the 
distinctions between our potential interlocutors.
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ical Turk system. Amazon goes to great lengths to make dealing 
with the human workers as much like interacting with artificial 
intelligence as possible, in keeping with the slogan of “Artificial 
Artificial Intelligence.” Irani (2015) calls the broader phenomenon 
the “digital microwork industry”: humans to finesse all the bits of 
affective analysis that pattern- matching AI still struggles with (an 
ironic echo of the original human “computers,” occupationally 
producing calculations before their work was mechanized). Beyond 
the implications for labor, justice, and the organization of society, 
I want to emphasize how deliberately vague the human and 
machine work is at the client’s interface: provision some capacity 
and dump modular tasks into it and let the system crunch away. 
Who knows if there’s a sentient consciousness at work? Does it 
matter? Seen in a certain light, John Searle’s Chinese Room looks 
like a knowledge worker’s factory floor.
The gap keeps narrowing between social network bots (and many 
other kinds of automated work, but this stays with our theme) 
and what Anab Jain (2014) calls “meatpuppets.” This is her term 
for people who join an internet discussion solely to influence it, 
and more broadly for how we as communicants on the network 
can be understood: as livestock for producing information, 
propagating memes, responding to automated notifications, and 
generally being a felt glove with glued- on eyes on the limb of a 
vast and intricate machine. A pack of adolescents activated by 
text messages or forum posts to attack an individual or disrupt an 
online conversation are, for purposes of managing the trouble they 
create, just bots that have easier time passing the various automat-
ed tests that try to prove humanness. (This speaks to Bunz’s point 
that it’s more important to look at the situation of communication 
than the subjects involved— because who or what the subjects are 
may be far more uncertain than we’d think.) Meatpuppets carry out 
tasks and narrow the human– machine gap— like interns at content 
farms, snorting Adderall and cranking out “content” in response to 
click rates, competing with software that does precisely the same 
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office space, bathroom breaks, or amphetamine.
This meatpuppet condition is perfectly expressed by the internal 
structure revealed in the Ashley Madison hack. Ashley Madison, 
a dating site for married people theoretically looking for affairs, 
was hacked in purported retaliation for its failure to fully delete 
the data of users who paid to be erased from the service. What 
is significant, for our purposes, is what was disclosed when the 
hackers (“the Impact Team”) dumped user records, corporate mem-
oranda, and much more onto the public web for scrutiny. There 
were almost no actual women on the site. The business model 
was to draw men into loops of interacting with simple chatbot 
programs, some based on profiles mass created by spammers, 
to keep them hooked on paying to send messages, “virtual gifts,” 
“winks,” and the rest of the pixel tat common to dating and social 
apps. Internal documents refer to this fembot population as the 
“fraud- to- engager tool,” turning merely curious male users into 
customers with a credit card on file (Newitz 2015). (Within the 
company, the bots were called “Angels.”) It is not simply that the 
men were interacting with procedural systems mistaken for people 
but that the men were themselves behaving procedurally and 
reliably as simple stimulus- response, A/B- tested systems that may 
show complexity in person but in aggregate can be tapped for sap 
like a stand of maple trees.
As the consequences of the hacked data dump played out, even 
the blackmail was mostly automated: clever extortionists set up 
sites where the curious (spouses, coworkers, the general public) 
could type in a name to see if someone was present in the Ashley 
Madison database as a customer— which would trigger an email 
to the name’s email address, threatening to reveal all the person’s 
Ashley Madison activities to his social network contacts unless 
blackmail was paid (in Bitcoin, no less) (Krebs 2015). A user of 
Ashley Madison could have a complete, personal, Dreiserian trag-
edy play out— curiosity, temptation, flirting, offers and promises, 
21exposure, shame, and secret extortion— that never once involved 
direct communication with another human being.
This brings me to the third point in my argument: the utility and 
significance for many purposes of aggregate data over individual 
expression on the network. The human contributions are often 
more useful in volume, as fodder for deep learning systems, 
predictive text algorithms, and translation engines, than as the 
outcome of any individual activity: not as much for what they tell 
us about you as for what they tell us about people like and unlike 
you. McKenzie Wark has discussed the unexpected side of the 
collapse of privacy on the network: not just the terrifying, targeted, 
Orwellian violations of personal autonomy for small numbers of 
dissidents, activists, and minorities worldwide— which was to be 
expected, tragically— but the indifference with regard to everyone 
else as individual identities (Gregg 2013). Your individual identity 
is in many ways the least interesting thing about you for purposes 
from advertising to social segmentation to assessing credit ratings 
to targeting a particular mobile phone signal for a drone strike: the 
ability to address and target you and others like and unlike you is 
more significant than your evaluation of what about you matters.
The common, lazy defense of surveillance— if you have nothing 
to hide, you have nothing to fear— is a useful illustration here 
because of how it misses the point: if you have nothing to hide, 
you are much more useful to a surveilling adversary because you 
help to distinguish those who do have something to hide. Your 
visibility probably does not matter (no one cares) but is helpful in 
how it informs the analysis of others. Your good credit aids in the 
identification of potential bad credit risks for discriminatory pricing. 
Individuals are merely biography; groups and social graphs are 
demography and Big Data, something far more useful. In other 
words, even when we are communicating with other humans 
(“directly,” as mediated and managed by the network), the content 
of our communication is of consequence well beyond any partic-
ular meaning it may have for us, as Big Data— data at a scale that 
calls into question any personal self- evaluation of their significance.
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experience of communication with machines. Human– machine 
communication is becoming a rich, coherent, ubiquitous part of 
everyday life, exemplified by the proliferation of “conversational 
user interface,” where all three of the points made so far in this 
section can be discerned.
“Saying that cultural objects have value,” wrote Brian Eno (1996, 
81) with a crisply aphoristic turn of phrase, “is like saying that 
telephones have conversations.” Of course we have conversations 
over the telephone, using the telephone, with other people, as we 
transact value across cultural objects; but the implicit logic has 
begun to break down. Telephones, particularly mobile devices like 
smartphones, have conversations, and we have conversations with 
them. Phone and interphone conversations happen constantly— 
handshake check- ins about location, transmission of carrier 
information, Wi- Fi requests, and pushing and pulling background 
information— though that stretches the definition of “conversation” 
too far. We also have more direct and apparent conversations 
with telephones and with the systems doing voice recognition on 
telephones; think of Siri, Cortana, and customer service.
As digital platform interaction moves from computers to mobile 
devices, the trend is clear: many systems converge on one 
interface, and that interface is texting. It mediates interactions with 
services through the same messaging modes we think of as texting 
with humans, making it a perfect platform for increasing human– 
machine engagement, side- stepping the challenges of extracting 
human voices from ambient noise and accounting for accents and 
the diversity of speech. (As it happens, Licklider’s career began 
in psychoacoustics, working on the problem of verbal communi-
cation in a mechanically noisy environment like the cockpit of a 
plane under fire.) From fitness (Lark) to personal finance (Digit) to 
personal assistants (Magic) to games (Lifeline) to logistics (Taobao’s 
阿里小蜜) to news (Quartz) to payment (many) and customer 
service (Rhombus and more), whole categories of media activity 
that would once have implied custom software platforms, tools, or 
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the handoffs between humans and machines can be seamless. 
An exchange that triggers an automated response and one that 
pops up as a thread on a person’s desktop or device, eliciting his 
response, are indistinguishable. As the most practical, quotidian 
matter, the easy binary split between people and machines that 
comes out in our prepositions— that we have conversations with 
people over telephones— is blurring.
All this contemporary activity may seem like rather old news to 
readers who recall Turing’s (1950) rebuttals to the “arguments from 
various disabilities” against the possibility of artificial intelligence 
in his landmark paper “Computing Machinery and Intelligence.” 
Turing’s argument in favor of the possibility of computers having 
minds can be crudely summarized: if you think the machines are 
dumb, you should see the people. The argument builds on the 
assumption that machines can’t be thinking because thinking is 
a special property of humanness, to which Turing responds, well, 
in what ways do you evaluate whether other people— or indeed 
you yourself— are thinking? Take that set of criteria and apply it to 
everything else, and see what passes; this is a way of eliminating 
what Reza Negarestani (2015) has called the “straw machine argu-
ment.” Hence the Imitation Game, also known as the Turing test, 
which we pass in limited forms in the field constantly now— and 
here we touch closely on Bunz’s half of this book, with the modes 
of address that are coming to typify that exchange. People give 
their credit card numbers away to seductive interaction designs; 
the programs that need to distinguish human users from all kinds 
of bots are in difficult straits; and even a living, breathing human 
user can effectively be a bot, or functionally indistinguishable from 
one. This boundary promises to become still more permeable now 
that so much of the research initiative is moving toward abstracting 
the most subjective, intimate areas of communication, from facial 
expressions to sentiment analysis to “interestingness.”
In light of this, I argue that we are in the process of building 
deeply inhuman (which I do not mean in a pejorative sense) 
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partially constitute, and it is in the context of those systems that we 
now communicate— “the computer as a communication device.” “In 
thought and political analysis, we still have not cut off the head of 
the king,” Foucault (1990, 89) famously wrote; I’m worried that I still 
habitually think the king has a head. We did not make humanlike 
interlocutors, just humanlike interaction and interface designs 
that sit atop an infrastructure that has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the anatomy, physiology, or even cognitive processes that 
define the shifting borders of humanness. Then, as Bunz describes, 
we made it talk to us as if we were children, complete with cute 
animals. It is this infrastructure that we communicate through 
and, more and more often, with. We have theories about how we 
communicate with nonhumans of all kinds, from Lucy Suchman’s 
situated actions to Donna Haraway’s companion species to  
anthropological studies of humans in natural environments to 
theories of biosemiotics. I wonder if we could push them further:  
to think about exchanges with things that are alien to us in a 
different sense.
As it happens, another area of human imagination and scientific 
research is concerned with logical formalisms, binary pulses, and 
the communication of language and images to a “missing subject.” 
It closely tracks and in some cases overlaps with the history of 
electromagnetic and computational communications media, and 
it shares a great deal with them. I believe it offers a useful analogy 
for our current situation: a series of examples of extraterrestrial 
media formats in which we as humans have attempted to commu-
nicate with the truly alien, in experimental arrangements we are 
now in the process of re- creating on our own planet.
Hello	from	Earth
Consider this thought experiment: we want to communicate with 
a potentially habitable planet. Therefore we send a signal that will 
take decades or centuries to reach a distant star, with no prior 
25understanding of the biology or sensory anatomy of our commu-
nicants, much less their symbol systems or their technical instru-
ments or the nature of their cognition. What to send? The work of 
communicating with aliens is the work of communicating with an 
entity that is for present purposes almost entirely unknowable— an 
entity that the anthropologist Klara Capova (2013), in her study of 
extraterrestrial signal work, calls the “missing subject.” What, then, 
do we communicate?
This is a useful question to ask for two reasons.
The first is that the process of trying to develop formats, rules, 
systems, and messages for communicating with other entities 
that are fundamentally unknowable turns out to be very closely 
connected with many historical and contemporary problems in 
computing and telecommunications. The theoretical problem of 
communicating with aliens turns out to share a great deal with the 
practical problem of communicating with computers.
The second reason cuts a bit deeper: studying formats for 
extraterrestrial communication is a useful starting point because 
it necessarily forces a reevaluation of our human biases— bodily 
assumptions, cognitive habits, arrangements of language and what 
constitutes meaningfulness— that shape our concepts of what 
communication is. We have to carefully consider our assumptions 
about the other elements of the situation of communication that 
Bunz breaks apart in looking at how we are hailed and addressed. 
My hope is that these formats open dimensions of analysis that 
might otherwise escape us, which will apply to understanding 
communication over and with networked computers.
I focus on the act of communicating— broadcasting radio waves, 
flashing lights— precisely because it is the most demanding case. 
The Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI) is usually divided 
into so- called passive and active SETI, where passive is listening: 
the fields of radiotelescopes scanning the skies for anything out of 
the ordinary. It is the search for potentially meaningful events, like 
the “Wow!” transmission from 1977— named for the remark Jerry 
26 Ehman wrote on the printout next to the code representing the 
intensity of the signal (Gray and Ellingsen 2002). It’s a fascinating 
and important process, but more pertinent are the projects in 
which we try to figure out how to address ourselves to our unknow-
able interlocutors— when we don’t just look for regular or unusual 
patterns that could be meaningful to us but try to create formats 
that will be meaningful to an unknown and unknowable subject.
Mirrors	and	Morse	Code:	 
A	Clear	Suggestion	of	Number	and	Order
Early attempts at an “interstellar language” are abstract more in an 
artistic than a mathematical sense, reading like proposals for vast 
Land Art initiatives and minimal sculptures on an enormous scale. 
Their components (mirrors, trenches, agriculture) suggest Robert 
Smithson with the resources of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
Robert Wood, a physicist who made major contributions to both 
ultraviolet light and ultrasound research, proposed a system of 
black cloth baffles, miles on a side, built in the desert and opened 
and closed by motor— a grid of pixels that could send “a series of 
winks” to observing Martians (Popular Science 1919, 75). Camille 
Flammarion argued for vast tracts of electric lights built in the Sa-
hara, shining upward when Mars was in opposition. An A. Mercier, 
a colleague of Flammarion’s, proposed constructing an enormous 
mirror or electric light in the heart of Paris (on the Champ- de- Mars, 
no less) (Frollo 1899). Alternatively— assuming that there might be 
some conservative opposition to constructing the brightest light 
on the planet, at the scale of the Brooklyn Bridge, in the heart 
of a densely inhabited metropolis— he suggested installing two 
mirrors on a mountain so that sunset light would reflect onto the 
shadowed side oriented to flash up at Mars, taking advantage of 
the dark background to use the light for better effect (Crowe 1986, 
397).
Over the course of decades, two recurring landscape- as- medium 
proposals, generally but apocryphally attributed to the astronomer 
Joseph von Littrow and the mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss, 
27kept reappearing: to dig canals in the Sahara (circles or squares), 
fill them with kerosene, and set them on fire at night or to plant ag-
ricultural tracts in Siberia laid out as the square of the hypotenuse 
(the “windmill” diagram) (Crowe 1986, 205). Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, 
the great pioneer of rocketry (and advocate for the cosmic future of 
the human species), envisioned yet more tracts of mirrors (Crowe 
1986, 397). Had there been a bit more free capital around for the 
turn- of- the- century “Mars mania,” we might have some vast field of 
dusty, angled mirrors abandoned and reflecting the empty sky on a 
desert plateau somewhere, a Ballardian monument to the void.
All of these were more or less visual media projects, expressions 
of an era devoted to the idea of a crowded and lively solar system 
with canals on Mars, cloud forests on Venus, and underground 
populations of selenites on the moon. Franz von Paula Gruithuisen 
thought the famous “ashen light” sometimes observed on dark 
Venus was the product of “general festivals of fire given by the Ve-
nusians,” with the forty- seven years between observations reflect-
ing “the reign of an absolute monarch” before “another Alexander 
or Napoleon comes to supreme power on Venus.” (Gruithuisen is 
sadly but accurately described by Crowe [1986, 204] as “a man of 
vast energy, extensive learning, excellent eyesight and instrumen-
tation, and little sense.”) Perhaps, speculated Mercier, the “flashes” 
observed on Mars were a response to the dazzling lighting of the 
Universal Exposition of Paris in 1889 (Crowe 1986, 397). When A. E. 
Douglass noted a “projection” on the Martian surface, which was 
reported in the press as another attempt at communication with 
Earth, he received theories as to the architecture of the population 
that could create such an effect: “Suppose the people of Mars 
have built a monument 10 miles square and a hundred miles high, 
covered exteriorly with polished marble” (Crowe 1986, 398).
If the populated universe were so neighborly, surely we could build 
tools by analogy to the Chappe semaphore telegraph, using basic 
visual symbols to convey the fact of existence and perhaps more 
complex information. Contacting the moon or Mars this way would 
be of a piece with broader technological transformations of the 
28 media apparatus, wrote Flammarion: “it is, perhaps, less bold than 
that of the telephone, or the phonograph, or the photophone, or 
the kinetograph” (Crowe 1986, 395). Even Gauss, much less prone 
to flights of fancy like his colleague Gruithuisen’s “mad chatter,” 
considered the use of the heliotrope— the mirror apparatus 
for reflecting sunlight over long distances to mark positions for 
surveying— for signaling: “This would be a discovery even greater 
than that of America, if we could get in touch with our neighbors 
on the moon.” (In March 1822, with some back- of- the- envelope 
estimation, Gauss envisioned a hundred sixteen- square- foot 
mirrors used together— which would have been a splendid object, 
a fit companion to the Jantar Mantar architectural– astronomical 
buildings in Jaipur [Crowe 1986, 207].)
The visual component of these early projects tended to duck the 
follow- on question of what, precisely, was to be signaled and how it 
would be conveyed. All we could do was provide some evidence of 
our existence— a flashing light— and then presumably the acknowl-
edgment would set the terms of the conversation. When the issue 
of the identity of our interlocutors was raised at all, it was under-
stood that they would be more or less like us: after all, did they not 
dig canals and irrigation trenches? For purposes of communication, 
we could assume they were further along our inevitable historical 
and technological trajectory, “far superior to us” as Flammarion 
put it (Crowe 1986, 395). “Perhaps we will learn from an older and 
wiser planet how we ought to run the Earth,” as Popular Science 
(1919, 74) had it with reference to telling the Martians about 
the just- concluded First World War. Only a few would- be stellar 
communicants consider the possibility of an alien biology. Francis 
Galton (1896, 661) has a hypothetical Martian transmission cracked 
by a little girl who points out that it’s in base- 8, not base- 10, be-
cause Martians count with six limbs and two antennae, like “highly 
developed ants,” rather than ten fingers and toes. Gauss, rigorously 
imaginative as ever, “considering the universal nature of matter,” 
hypothesized life on the sun with its massively higher gravity to 
consist of “only very tiny creatures . . . whereas our bodies would 
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how seventeenth- century English translations of ancient Greek 
make Achilles into a contemporary gentleman, always on the verge 
of taking snuff; likewise, despite these steps away from anthro-
pomorphism, the assumptions of those plotting miles of mirrors 
on mountain slopes are that Martians will be, more or less, as we 
are— that we are addressing advanced Kants whose study windows 
happen to look out on canals at the foot of Olympus Mons. The 
conversation will be “begun by means of such mathematical con-
templations and ideas, as we and they have in common,” suggested 
Gauss (Crowe 1986, 206).
Even here, though, a more specific and abiding problem is becom-
ing apparent: How are we to communicate anything more complex 
than a flash of light or a right triangle? What does “communication” 
mean, in this instance? Once we build those grids of electric lights 
in the high desert, we can’t just use “the Morse Code for it were 
idle to suppose the Martians are familiar with this” (Crowe 1986, 
400). In a problem with echoes of the Turing test or the Imitation 
Game, cruelly inverted, how do we distinguish human activities and 
attempts to communicate from the effects of natural events for an 
unknown observer— volcanoes, auroras, bioluminescent seas, and 
the radio hubbub of the universe at large?
That remark about Morse code is pertinent, because it is at this 
point that the project of alien communication begins to shift from 
the kinds of signaling techniques familiar to lost campers and 
marooned sailors— flash a mirror, light a signal fire, arrange rocks 
in a geometric shape— to richer, more abstract problems of com-
munication that speak to the challenges of digital systems. As with 
schizophrenic– paranoid anxieties, our models for human– alien 
communication closely track developments in media technology. 
Just after the turn of the century, Tesla (1901, 5) reported pick-
ing up signals from Mars (or possibly Venus) while building his 
experimental wireless transmission apparatus in Colorado Springs, 
with “a clear suggestion of number and order.” He announced 
the dawn of this new age in an article, “Talking with the Planets,” 
30 which included a few lines that perfectly capture the combination 
of cosmic grandeur and can- do pragmatism that would come 
to characterize many of these communication projects: “with an 
expenditure not exceeding two thousand horsepower, signals can 
be transmitted to a planet such as Mars with as much exactness 
and certitude as we now send messages by wire from New York 
to Philadelphia” (4). The astronomer David Peck Todd, in 1909, 
proposed lifting “the most sensitive wireless telegraph receiver 
available” into the upper atmosphere with a balloon to pick up 
extraplanetary signals (Crowe 1986, 399). Through all of this, the 
problem of what to communicate— indeed, how to appear as a 
communicative act— remained uncertain. Tesla (1901, 5) breezily 
confirmed that communication, initiated by “a mere interchange of 
numbers,” would rapidly move to “more intelligible” forms.
Part of the answer begins with the challenges presented by com-
municating using the new technical media themselves. There was 
a kind of symmetry between the two different forms of nonhuman 
communication.
Cros’s	Étude:	Designs	as	Number	Series
Charles Cros is now known— if he is known at all— as one of media 
history’s also- rans, or as the author of some delightfully frustrating 
poetry. He invented techniques for three- color photography and 
a version of the phonograph, both of which he registered more or 
less immediately contemporary to other, more successful projects. 
(His phonograph— called, beautifully, the paleophone, voix de passé, 
the “past’s voice”— was in many ways an Edisonian foil phonograph, 
not quite at the prototype stage, just as Edison was rolling out 
his first model.) He was one of the circle of hydropathes, artists 
and writers who shared a fumiste attitude combining outrageous 
subject matter with deadpan style, the result of a mocking, cryptic, 
too- cool sensibility that throws up a smokescreen and baffles 
outsiders— much of Erik Satie’s dry amusement, his piano pieces 
played “like a nightingale with a toothache,” is very fumiste— and 
specialized in grating nonsense poetry, like “The Salt Herring,” to be 
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century inventor- dilettante, he also spent time on a project to 
manufacture fake jewels [Cros 1970, 541].) When not engaging in 
acts of deliberately failed communication with other humans, Cros 
was petitioning the French government to construct a huge and 
technically infeasible Archimedean burning mirror to etch shapes 
onto the deserts of Mars as a communications initiative. Concealed 
within the work of a man seemingly custom built for a cabinet of 
historical curiosities, however, was something far more  
profound.
In “Étude sur les moyens de communication avec les planètes,” 
Cros (1970, 519) begins to seriously consider the challenge of re-
ciprocal communication with an alien intelligence. He takes up the 
basic concept now well established— an enormous mirror flashing 
light to be seen by an observer on another planet— but asks how 
information is to be conveyed once the lines of communication 
have been opened. He considers, first, how a sequence of rhythmic 
flashes could be used to encode numbers but then takes up the 
question of whether those numbers could in turn encode images. A 
series of digits could communicate binary pixels— spaces black or 
white, off or on— in lines on an ordered grid, in the style of “6– 1 2– 0 
3– 1 7– 0” for
XXXXXX00XXX0000000
using integers rather than having to flash all those signals one by 
one. (Cros devotes some time to how exactly this message- sending 
protocol would be initially communicated.) As he outlines his proj-
ect, it becomes clear to the modern reader that he has developed 
a version of what is now called “run- length encoding,” an image 
compression and transmission technology akin to that used in fax 
machines, early digital bitmap images, and some of the very first 
television technologies collected by Siegfried Zielinski. There would 
need to be encoding systems for turning images— and, potentially, 
other kinds of media— into materials for this notation- transmission 
apparatus: “analogous notation procedures for rendering designs 
32 as number series are used in various industries, including weaving 
and embroidery.”
At this point, the ears of historians of computing might prick up: 
what kind of industrial weaving machines, pray tell? “There is, in 
[Jacquard weaving], a whole science that, as so often happens, 
was practiced before it was theorized. From it will emerge a new 
and important branch of mathematics, and eventually a new 
classification of these primordial sciences [i.e., the sciences of 
information and data storage]. The study of rhythms [patterns 
and encoding systems] will take its place alongside that of figures” 
(Cros 1970, 534). In context, Cros’s “study of rhythms” means a 
set of instructions to be carried out in a particular order on the 
machine’s material: what we would now call an algorithm. What we 
have here is a project to turn Earth into a graphics card, encoding 
images and eventually other data for transmission to be rendered 
and displayed elsewhere. The project of developing nonhuman 
communication, with its problems of abstraction, encoding, com-
pression, error correction, and display, turns out to be analogous 
to the problem of developing computable media— to “what we now 
call programming.”
Astraglossa:	How	to	Point	at	Things
“What we now call”: it was new then, in 1952, when the zoologist 
and medical statistician Lancelot Hogben wrote “Astraglossa,” a 
lighthearted but extremely thorough and detailed study of the 
format of potential extraterrestrial communication. During the 
Second World War, Hogben (1943) had published “Interglossa,” 
a proposal for an auxiliary language with an inventively simple 
structure— a kind of international argot of science and technology 
inspired by the complexities of teaching biology to a cosmopolitan 
student body. Astraglossa is something else entirely: not a lan-
guage as such but an analysis of what it means to communicate 
with a nonhuman, unknowable interlocutor. Prior to meaning 
as such, prior to language, Hogben— who in his working life was 
occupied with hormonal signals of African clawed frogs and color- 
33shifting reptiles and amphibians— was interested in the most 
minimal order of signaling: “a technique of how to point at things” 
(Hogben 1963, 126). If we assume (and this is already a large and 
complex assumption) that those we seek to contact share a sense 
of time— and with it number, interval, and the stars— then we can 
produce what for Hogben constitutes the fundamental structure 
of this most minimal nonhuman communication: rank order, gaps, 
and iteration. That is, if all you can communicate are sequences 
of electromagnetic pulses, dots and dashes, you rely on order in 
time. A shorter time interval separates a chunk of pulses meant to 
be taken conceptually together, and a longer interval marks the 
conclusion of a linked series of such chunks— gaps. Their sequence 
in time establishes the role of different sequences of pulses— rank 
order. One follows another, with the same or different operations 
executed repeatedly to arrive at a result— iteration:
1 .. Fa .. 1.1 .. Fa .. 1.1.1 .. Fb .. 1.1.1.1.1.1
or one plus two plus three equals six, with the periods standing for 
units of time between pulses. The Fs in Hogben’s notation refer to 
“flashes,” sequences of pulses with distinctive properties whose 
placement by gaps and rank order suggests the operation of addi-
tion and identification or equality.
We have pulses and the time between pulses, some of which we 
can arrange into operations— addition, subtraction, identity, affir-
mation and negation, and so on— and we can then, given enough 
time, stack the operations into “flashes” that constitute rules: apply 
the set of operations collected by this rule to the following string of 
numbers. Followed by silence. Which thus becomes the framework 
for a signal, a flash, corresponding to elicitation or a question— 
awaiting the product of an operation performed. All of this should 
begin to sound rather familiar: “The only unmentioned clue that 
I regard as specially relevant to our theme I shall merely refer to 
en passant, viz. what we now call programming, i.e. the syntax of 
the language in which we transmit orders to the new electronic 
computing machines.”
34 The parallels that Hogben (1963) draws are illustrative not only of 
his thinking about this subject but of the larger challenges of find-
ing the edges of the concept of communication— the places where 
we enter and leave the communicable, what he calls the “common 
field of semantic reference” (124). He draws on the history of 
interpreting the Mayan glyphs— which, in 1952 as he composed 
these ideas, had only encompassed the numerical and astronomi-
cal and calendrical systems present in the language. He compares 
the project to the universal visual languages of Otto Neurath’s 
ISOTYPE and Charles Bliss’s semantography (or as it is now known, 
Blissymoblics)— both of which build symbolic vocabularies that 
don’t correspond to sounds but instead express concepts wholly 
through visual objects and abstract operators. He plays at length 
on the theme of childhood, infancy, and education: how do we 
try to teach shared symbol systems to children? He compares the 
puzzles of establishing concepts like antitheses, interrogatives, and 
assents to “a fuller case history of Helen Keller” (131). All of these 
analogies are laden and complex, and it would be very interesting 
to consider the different models of “communication” they imply— 
but most interesting for our purposes is the challenge of alien 
communication expressed as an essentially computational  
problem.
All of his other comparisons rely on human commonalities, 
from the shared sky over Mayan Mesoamerica to the silhouettes 
and color codes of ISOTYPE to Keller’s understanding and Anne 
Sullivan’s hands, making this computational aspect stand out all the 
more. The challenge of establishing a shared binary symbol system 
and logic of operations, predicated on gaps, rank order, and 
iteration, closely resembles the work done by Turing, Tom Kilburn, 
Freddie Williams, and others to build Turing- complete electronic 
computers in Manchester and London contemporaneously with 
Hogben’s talk. (Manchester happens to be the city where Hogben 
sets his fictional classroom of analogical Martian pupils.) Finding 
the minimal fundamentals necessary to express more complex 
ideas has parallels with Boolean algebra and logical processes like 
35Charles Sanders Peirce’s (1989) demonstration that NOR gates, 
properly arranged, can produce the functions of all logic gates and 
therefore of a functionally complete logical system (what came to 
be called “Peirce’s arrow”).
Finally and crucially, however, this is not the full extent of Hogben’s 
ambition. He does not want to establish logic for its own sake, to 
produce “a monologue of simple assertions,” but as a step toward 
a rapport. The later parts of his study playfully but carefully analyze 
how he could establish pronouns (your and our, it and they, I- ness); 
terms of assent, denial, and doubt; conditionals and assertions; 
causes and consequences, entirely within a system of binary pulses 
and “flash” operators with reference to time and stellar objects. The 
ultimate goal is to use the framework of this logic for “reciprocal 
communication” with the unknown, as “our Neolithic forebears . . . 
can communicate with us” through numerical and calendrical relics 
like notched bones and standing stones, or as we “transmit orders 
to the new electronic computing machines.”
Of course, even this elegant attempt at a minimal set of commu-
nication components relies on some necessary assumptions as to 
how it will be interpreted and understood.
“How does it come about that this arrow >>>– – > points? Doesn’t it 
seem to carry in it something besides itself?” So asks Wittgenstein 
(2001), in section 454 of the Philosophical Investigations. Why, when 
someone points, do we assume that the direction runs from elbow 
to fingertip and not the other way around? (Or, as Laurie Anderson 
[1983] asked of the waving man depicted on the Pioneer Plaque, 
the engraved plates of aluminum mounted on the Pioneer space-
craft in the hope of being intercepted by extraterrestrials: “Do you 
think that they will think his arm is permanently attached in this po-
sition?”) Wittgenstein notes, “Perhaps a Martian would describe the 
picture so.” How would our unknown audience listen to something, 
for instance? Again, the challenge of formatting extraterrestrial 
conversation takes us directly to the puzzles of communication in 
technological media.
36 Set aside, for a moment, the complexities entailed by establishing 
the primitives of formal logic using only radio pulses beamed 
to some corner of the sky with decades- long time lag. Instead 
just imagine a record— an analog LP. Take it for granted that the 
recipients will be able to decipher the instructions for building the 
player or will invent their own. What do we put on the record to 
express our experience?
Voyager	and	Arecibo:	A	Martian	Would	 
Describe	the	Picture	So
That’s the most common question for such a project: we jump to 
the content of the communication— the usual Bach- or- Fela Kuti- or- 
a- child’s- laugh debate about which object could stand in for many 
objects, which unit expresses a category. More difficult and much 
more profound, however, is the question of format: what about this 
groove etched in an anodized disk conveys that this is “our” “ex-
perience” prior to any particular chunk of that experience? Just as 
conducting even the most minimal conversation about astronomical 
states requires us to reinvent time and spatial notation, we- you pro-
nouns, direction, and ordinality, so the commonsensicality of sound 
demands deep consideration, one which echoes Kittler’s work.
Imagine two records, then. One is made of gold- plated copper 
from 1977, currently in interstellar space outside the heliosheath. 
The other is a dictation cylinder produced in 1900. Kittler has 
written about the latter, emphasizing one of the most significant 
and least obvious things about it: that it records the voice, not 
just “the words.” It is a mechanical process, transforming what is 
said not into words, as a scribe would, but into data storage— the 
stylus records the voice aspeak but also the birds singing outside, 
the creaking of the floorboards underfoot, and of course the 
mechanical noise of the recording medium itself. It shifts the 
boundaries of what can be inscribed and recorded— what becomes 
part of the record, part of discourse. Along with other novel media 
technologies, it creates a new form of human expression that 
37sounds familiar to our present data- driven order: that we expose 
what is most personal and individual to us not through what we 
deliberately say but through what the machines pick up about us. 
We are our fingerprints, unconscious microexpressions captured 
on film, our tone of voice and mistakes of speech and background 
sounds. (From Blow- Up to Blow Out to The Conversation to The Girl 
with the Dragon Tattoo, a new genre has come into being based on 
the tales told by machines recording events whose significance at 
first escapes their human users.) “Only the phonograph can record 
all the noise produced by the larynx prior to any semiotic order and 
linguistic meaning” (Kittler 1999, 16). And only for humans would 
all that extraneous noise be so invisible: the gray velvet mounts on 
which the gleaming jewelry of spoken language is displayed, when 
we encounter it through the mediation of tinfoil and shellac, nails 
and needles and resonant cones.
Jon Lomberg, reflecting on the production of the Voyager “Golden 
Disk” in 1977, articulated the problem (Lemarchand and Lomberg 
2011). The record was to include music, human speech, tech-
nological sounds, animal sounds, and natural sounds produced 
by the planet, addressed to unknown alien listeners. Within the 
format of the recording itself, Lomberg and his colleagues wanted 
to convey a set of profound and subtle distinctions. First, there 
were distinctions in “nature of the sound” between the music and 
the other sounds. The music was to be experienced and analyzed 
for its structure, but the other sounds were to be identified for 
their informational content. Music expresses subjective states; 
the other sounds are objective conditions. (I ask the reader’s 
indulgence in these deep waters about the questions already 
raised— that human sounds, music included, are not a product of 
nature— just to consider the format and communication problems.) 
Furthermore, and still more delicately: how to communicate that 
the speech (greetings in different languages, children talking, party 
noise), technology (hammering nails, engines turning over), and 
music are all “our” sounds and birdsong, bees buzzing, a roll of 
thunder, dogs barking, and whalesong are not?
38 Lomberg sought to connect human activities with the sound of a 
heartbeat, running it as a backing track to distinguish “our” sounds 
from all the others— and to produce a kind of sequence, a variant 
of Hogben’s use of rank order and gaps, with the technological 
sounds as a series of acoustic narratives that would build from 
running feet through internal combustion to a jet engine and a 
rocket launch. Indeed, Lomberg exploited the very property of 
audio recording that Kittler emphasizes: that the voice as inscribed 
is no longer a matter of words understood, interpreted, and written 
but a bodily event of moderated breath in the larynx. The record-
ings of speech should be made “so that an intake of breath before 
syllables could be heard. This would link breathing with speech, 
and perhaps give a clue as to the respiratory nature of speech, and 
link the sounds of speech with the heartbeat” (Lemarchand and 
Lomberg 2011, 379). The heartbeat was a kind of metadata about 
a particular set of sounds. Given the fearsome complexities and 
challenges in interstellar linguistics, perhaps the most important 
and salient component of our recorded speech is precisely that it is 
anatomical first and foremost.
Every extraterrestrial communication project forces two assertions: 
the minimal requirements for communication and the most 
significant matter to be communicated. With a few exceptions, like 
the Voyager record, the minimal requirements are pulses, binary 
strings of energy encoding different kinds of messages or repre-
sentational schemes— in other words, systems more or less directly 
inspired by or in dialogue with computing and telecommunications 
projects. Cros was a forerunner, well ahead of the state of the art 
in adapting notation from Jacquard looms to produce a celestial fax 
machine; by the 1970s, with the famous Arecibo message, Frank 
Drake (1992) had worked out a string of 1,679 bits (on and off 
pulses, repeating) to be sent from the radiotelescope of the same 
name in Puerto Rico. The number 1,679 is semiprime, the product 
of the primes 23 and 73, and if you arrange the on and off signals 
in order in a grid of twenty- three columns and seventy- three rows, 
you have a picture— with the pulses as the pixels.
39And what content? What is the substance of communication 
with unknown and unknowable interlocutors to be? A minimal 
set of facts, almost always: a numbering system, a set of stellar 
coordinates, a few facts of chemistry, a human silhouette. Arecibo, 
read top to bottom, provided numbers in binary, the atomic 
weight of the basic elements in our biology and the chemistry of 
DNA, our population and physical shape (the wavelength of the 
message itself provides the scale), the arrangement of our solar 
system, and finally the antenna itself. Most such messages are 
necessarily humble, primarily concerned with the structure of their 
own decoding— after all, the simple, phatic fact of a we are here 
statement is itself of enormous consequence. Successful use of the 
medium, with a signal distinguishable from the electromagnetic 
activity of the universe in general, is the event. The content can be 
more or less of the “Watson— come here— I want you” / “What hath 
God wrought?” / “This has been a day of solid achievement” variety 
(for telephone, telegraph, and hard drive, respectively).
Even here though, beaming minimal signals to distant stars and 
“missing subjects,” we find ambitious projects to expand on what 
the format is capable of— and we reconnect completely with the 
question of rethinking “communication” in terms of our own 
nonhuman and alien media technologies. What can we commu-
nicate using this set of binary pulses and logical primitives? What 
are the limits? People have built everything from more complex 
Arecibo- like messages, with new pixel arrangements (Zaitsev and 
Ignatov 1999). The “CosmicOS,” a “self- contained message” made 
of four symbols that account for binary code and brackets, acts 
as a kind of computer program to be executed. (It looks like this: 
◇|◇◇◇◇||◇⎣□⎤ . . .) This last example, while also playful, is exact 
and thorough and speaks directly to the challenge of thinking past 
our own biology in our communication efforts. One of the goals of 
CosmicOS is
to avoid making too many assumptions about the percep-
tual abilities of the non- human intelligence; for example 
that they make sense of 2D images in the same way we 
40 do. While some arguments can be made for this, as a ma-
chine vision researcher I am very skeptical that we really 
understand the variability possible here. (Fitzpatrick, n.d.)
It is through thinking about how machines can “see”— or can use 
novel techniques to do something like seeing— that we can also 
understand how different forms of life might see, or sense, or oth-
erwise interact with visible light.
CosmicOS builds on another, earlier experiment in pushing the 
limits of possible extraterrestrial communication: the constructed 
language Lincos. It is one of the most rigorously eccentric intellec-
tual projects of the twentieth century, to put “in principle the whole 
bulk of our knowledge” into a form communicable to any possible 
intelligent life, and we will close this chapter with it.
Lingua	Cosmica:	Human,	or	at	Least	 
Humanlike
“He begins with elementary mathematics,” writes Marvin Minksy 
(1985) of the Lincos project, “and shows how many other ideas, 
including social ideas, might be based on that foundation.” Minsky, 
one of the major figures in AI research— cofounder of MIT’s AI 
laboratory, author of The Society of Mind, advisor to Clarke and 
Kubrick in the production of 2001— is describing the work of the 
mathematician Hans Freudenthal. The lingua cosmica, or Lincos, is 
a language that begins with “peeps” of discrete radio pulses for the 
natural numbers and ends with relativistic mechanics. On the way, 
it includes set theory, cardinality and ordinality, assertions (“Future 
events cannot be perceived”), a “short history of Fermat’s theorem,” 
“examples of polite speech,” bets and gambling, the act of wishing, 
points and vectors, and “whistling for one’s dog.” (“The dog refus-
es.”) And this was to be only part one of a projected two,  
with the second including chapters on “Matter,” “Earth,” and  
“Life” and an additional supplement on “Behavior” to build on  
the first book (Freudenthal 1960, 23). All of these contributions  
are rendered in an increasingly complex formal notation, express-
41ing how they would be transmitted as radio pulses. It looks like 
this:
↔PauAnt▪HeDatHd.Den0,101∎
Once we are past the same basics touched on in one way or 
another by every broadcast concept more complex than Arecibo— 
numbers, spatial coordinates, timing, basic logical and mathemat-
ical operations— Freudenthal, like Hogben, wants to do something 
far more ambitious than simple declarations about the nature 
of things. He establishes a set of human actors and embarks on 
a series of logical– minimalist playlets. These conversations and 
events between Ha and Hb— described entirely in Freudenthal’s 
formal notation— establish stories about the nature of the world 
and, more to the point, about the nature of human experience in 
its most austere form. Ha throws a ball farther than Hb can catch it. 
Hb knows something but does not say it, which means that Ha does 
not know it; Ha can try to guess what it is that Hb knows. Ha and Hb 
know what happened in the past but not what will happen in the 
future, and they bet on an outcome together. Ha didn’t see some-
thing and therefore asks Hb about it. Together, they live in a world, 
and there are many other things that live in the world with them 
with whom they can’t communicate in the same way, even though 
those things can also see, hear, move, know the past, and chase a 
ball. They can die, Ha and Hb; so can all the other things with which 
they share the world. They can wish that things were otherwise 
than they are. When one of them dies, they can no longer talk.
It in no way diminishes Freudenthal’s strange achievement— an 
attempt at formalizing human life in the universe into a basic set 
of electromagnetic signals— to question its fitness for purpose: the 
nearest possible life is so far away that years or decades would 
separate each exchange confirming receipt and understanding 
with reciprocal signals. Some of Freudenthal’s dialogical units are 
hundreds of steps long, with multiple points needing confirmation; 
simply at the level of back and forth, this would be a millennial 
project. What he has produced in fact seems much closer— much 
42 more appropriate— to formulating properties of human experience 
not to communicate with aliens but with machines.
George Boole, walking across a field at seventeen in 1832, was 
struck by an idea that led to his book An Investigation of the Laws 
of Thought, a model of logical reasoning using a symbolic calculus 
built on what he called “the Universe” and “Nothing”— or 1 and 
0 (Boole 2009). What he produced was not an accurate portrait 
of the process of human reasoning, but it was, a century or so 
later, perfectly suited to performing complex mathematical and 
logical operations on electrical relays and vacuum tubes. Likewise, 
Freudenthal’s project is filled with striking insights, and many of 
them seem less applicable to broadcasting to Alpha Centauri than 
to explaining what it is to be a person in the universe to an entity 
that lacks anything but a memory and the input of a very limited 
set of electromagnetic symbols. No wonder Marvin Minsky, who 
constructed the first neural network simulator, was drawn to this 
research: it shoots for the stars and lands in the AI lab.
Indeed, one of the persistent challenges of AI has been precisely 
in recognizing the particular biases and tendencies in human cog-
nition that would not be shared by a machine— no more than the 
way we think that we see is shared or modeled by a sensor picking 
up photons. “I shall suppose that the person who is to receive my 
messages is human or at least humanlike as to his mental state 
and experiences,” writes Freudenthal (1960, 14). “I should not know 
how to communicate with an individual who does not fulfill these 
requirements.” Now we do so all the time: by voice, text, image, 
and the indirect production of data.
We have established rapport with an alien planet that we build 
and maintain around us, teaching its population to make spatial 
sense of the world, keep secrets, recognize faces, hear and 
compress and filter voices, make conversation, and interpret a 
far broader range of electromagnetic radiation than just radio 
waves or the visual spectrum. We have done all this with binary 
pulses, logical operations, and encoding and decoding schemes. 
43The informational commerce and exchange of the world take 
place in the dense network of Martian canals that we’ve dug for 
the last sixty years, and we communicate in ways that embody the 
problems and solutions of Cros and Gauss, Hogben and Lomberg 
and Freudenthal. Like fantastical narratives that act as accounts of 
our society alienated and rendered strange— from Gulliver’s Travels 
to Animal Farm— the three centuries of projects for communicating 
with unknowable, nonhuman interlocutors chronicled here can be 
rearranged (Erewhon becomes Nowhere) to be our most ordinary 
present: reacting to automated alerts, talking with customer 
service, solving CAPTCHAs to log in to Facebook.
This is our present state of mediated communication. What is our 
future?
The	Light	Cone
Hogben was not alone in this conceptual move, but he put it most 
eloquently: “Though we cannot communicate with our Neolithic 
forbears, they themselves can communicate with us through the 
mists of time”— with “astrocalendrical” hieroglyphs and number 
systems. Many extraterrestrial communication projects make refer-
ence to the case of our distant ancestors and their notched bones 
and standing stones marking, or appearing to mark, lunar se-
quence and equinoctial sunrise. With a basic vocabulary of forms, 
used to track regular cosmic patterns, they were able to establish a 
one- way communication channel over thousands of years. It seems 
similar, in some ways, to a message broadcast out into the void. 
But this position is riddled with problems if it is taken any more 
seriously than a straightforward statement on the value of num-
bers and astronomical events as points of common reference. After 
all, we enjoy anatomy, fundamental cognitive and social traits, and 
a planet in common. Why do we use ourselves in the past as a way 
of analogizing communication with alien life in the future?
This chapter has been concerned with the idea that, in considering 
communication in digital media, we should account for how alien, 
44 and how ubiquitous and invisible, the interlocutors and mediators 
we built have become. This corresponds to a dehumanization— 
again, not in a pejorative sense!— of contemporary digital media. I 
find the analogy of extraterrestrial communication useful in seeing 
this problem, because it forces questions about the anthropo-
centric sense of communication on digital networks and acts as 
a kind of parallel history of digital networks themselves and the 
formats we’ve developed to make use of them. Toward the end 
of the first section, I asserted that we could move beyond the 
models of Kittler and Licklider and Taylor to look at communication 
with the future as well as past and present— a future defined by 
communications media that are not just digital but alien. Rather 
than hiding their profound strangeness behind carefully designed 
interfaces and media that, to quote Bunz, “address us as if we were 
children,” complete with cartoon characters, bright flat design, 
and tinkly- tonkly toy instrument sound tracks, we should expose 
and explore— and even embrace— their alienness and, with it, the 
future.
We have talked about theories defining the limits of information, 
like Claude Shannon’s, but there is one more limit to communica-
tion: a temporal one. The light cone is the theoretical description of 
an event— a flash of light, a signal— propagating through space- 
time. What lies within the cone could have been influenced by the 
signal in some way. What lies within the future light cone, and could 
therefore receive a signal from a present moment, is the set of all 
future events that could be causally influenced by it. It’s a steadily 
expanding zone of possible causality and a way of understanding 
the temporality of information and communication. You can 
understand an event taking place here and now as being within 
the light cone of many remote objects in the universe, to the edge 
of observation itself— but as they were, of course, at the moment 
of an equally remote event, and not now. We are in their (far, far) 
future.
“To get information about the life and times for some inhabitants 
of a planet outside the Solar system, say, the fastest way that we 
45can get such information is by means of light signals,” write Grøn 
and Hervik (2007). “The light- cone tells us what region of spacetime 
we can get information from” (221). Both the way light moves and 
the speed at which it moves are hard limits on what can be known. 
All the emissions of attempted communication with alien life— the 
mostly hypothetical flashes of light, the bursts of radio signals— 
are light cone events, utterances in space- time. That is, they are 
communications not simply with a distant exoplanet but with our 
future.
If they are intercepted at all, these messages will arrive years— or 
more likely decades, millennia, or eons— later. Given time for 
interpretation and response, that almost unimaginable conver-
sation will likely take place after the original human speakers are 
dead. We likewise address ourselves to our present, in the act of 
communication, but also to a future likely populated with far more, 
and more diverse, varieties of alien interlocutors— the “missing 
subjects” who await our signals and whose predecessors we are 
programming, building, and installing on Earth at the moment.
I would like to end on this note of depersonalized optimism: that 
our present communicative acts on and with digital infrastructure 
put us in conversation not only with one another, or with our cur-
rent machinery, but also with far stranger communicants that will 
have as little resemblance to our media experience as Spanner does 
to the CTSS. Future technical infrastructures are what we digitally 
communicate with now, infrastructures far more alien in their likely 
operation, and in the place they occupy in the future itself. This is 
how we can retrospectively understand ourselves and our commu-
nication using contemporary digital media: messages formatted 
and transmitted to our alien planet to come, a little way down the 
light cone, close enough to guess at but unimaginably far away.
Note
I owe many thanks for this project, starting with Wendy Chun’s invitation to join 
the Terms of Media II conference. The question and discussion session during 
46 that event was invaluable. This piece was informed throughout by the work and 
conversation of Mercedes Bunz and Sara Dean. My thanks in particular to Boris 
Traue for a thoughtful, informed, and thorough editorial reading of the manu-
script, which improved it significantly; to Paula Bialski for analysis, suggestions, 
and the introduction; and to the staff of meson press and the insights of the 
peer reviewers. My fond gratitude to you all.
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The	Force	of	
Communication
Mercedes Bunz
The things around us, having become media, have started to 
address us. Their first utterances went unnoticed: for years, our 
cars have loudly insisted that we fasten our seat belts. Informed 
by sensors, they scream as if they feared for their bodies while 
being parked or shout for help when they reckon that someone 
else, whom they do not know, wants to take them. This mode 
of communication quickly spread to the house. Now the robotic 
vacuum cleaner eagerly informs us when it is stuck and asks us to 
“move Roomba to a new location.” And driven by new advances 
in natural language processing I have explored elsewhere (Bunz 
and Meikle 2018, 45– 67), intelligent personal assistants with 
names like Siri and Alexa wake up to address us when they hear 
someone calling their names— in contrast to our fellow humans, 
who ignore everyone around them while under the spell of a 
screen. When things became interactive, they established a new 
kind of dialogue with us, the humans. To use technical interfaces 
today means to communicate with technology. Of course, it is not 
technology itself that has raised its head and started to speak. 
Even though it has learned to communicate, it has not become a 
human subject, although it has always been more than an object. 
Heidegger ([1954] 1977, 4) had good reason to look further into 
the agency of technology by reconsidering what is usually taken 
52 for granted— “technology is a means to an end. . . . Technology is a 
human activity”— thereby questioning the instrumental definition 
of technology. Now that our technological devices have started to 
address us with multiple voices, we need to continue his analysis. 
So in what way can we investigate how technology addresses 
us without thinking it is speaking to us? For this is certain: when 
technology starts to speak, it is not technology we hear. Still, this is 
a development that is transforming our contemporary discourse 
and, with it, what can be called our “being with technology.” This 
essay explores the force of digital communication, starting with a 
methodological discussion of how to approach technology. Having 
clarified this, it then links different aspects together: communica-
tion theories and the way we are addressed by digital media, child 
psychology and computer science, interface design and political 
theory. But let us start this endeavor by looking at what happens— 
what forces speak— when we communicate.
Being	with	Technology
Communication theories have always suspected that communicat-
ing with media transforms our being in this world in various ways. 
This section approaches these theories and this transformation in 
three ways. First, it summarizes historical theories of communica-
tion to foreground their common assumption, namely, that there 
is a force happening when we communicate. To understand where 
this force is generally located when it comes to digital technology, 
it then turns to contemporary theories. Finally, it discusses tech-
nology as a situation: the situation of being addressed by digital 
technology. But let’s start with historic takes on communication.
Over the years, theorists have developed very different takes on 
communication. Yet, one assumption has always been at the heart 
of all theories: there is a force happening while we communicate. 
The following communication theories illustrate this, although the 
list is by no means exhaustive:
53Shannon. An interest in the force of communication can 
already be noticed in one of the early theoretical takes on 
communication, in Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver’s 
(1949) The Mathematical Theory of Communication, which 
my coauthor Finn Brunton discusses with brilliance and 
in more detail in chapter 1. Their theoretical concept of 
information implies that the capacity of a medium defines 
its possibilities to produce meaning, thereby claiming a 
certain dependency on the transmitting medium. Inspired 
by their theory, the German media theorist Friedrich 
Kittler (1999, xxxix) would condense this later to the claim 
that “media determine our situation, which— in spite or 
because of it— deserves a description.”
Derrida. The French philosopher adds to this perspective 
(that something else is going on when communication is 
happening) by observing that communication also does 
not simply transmit content. As he points out in his well- 
known essay “Signature Event Context” (Derrida 1977), 
sending a message relies on its fundamental capacity for 
displacement. The fact that a message functions after it 
has been sent from A to B means that it “breaks with its 
context” (9) and has an “iterative structure, cut off from all 
absolute responsibility.” In other words, one can never be 
certain of its meaning.
Williams. The cultural critique points again to a very 
different aspect, one more related to the link of communi-
cation with “communion.” In his Keywords: A Vocabulary of 
Culture and Society, Williams (1985, 72) discusses the force 
of communication that lies in its distributive act: “make 
common to many, impart.” When communication makes 
something common to many, however, two very different 
things can happen, as Williams points out: it can “trans-
mit” in “a one way process” or “share” (72). In this capacity, 
54 communication has the force to manipulate as well as to 
integrate and foster participation.
Haraway. Not far from this position, we find the import-
ant take of Donna Haraway on communication technolo-
gies. In “A Cyborg Manifesto” (Haraway 1991), she points 
to a very specific force by showing that communication 
technologies create social relations that structure our 
identity, which means that they can also restructure it. 
Haraway thus points out that they can be “crucial tools 
recrafting our bodies” and that “they should also be 
viewed as instruments for enforcing meanings” (Haraway 
1991, 164). According to her, communication can be a 
discursive weapon.
Although the preceding approaches articulate very different per-
spectives and motives, all of them notice a force happening when 
there is communication— a force that is shaping our situation 
through shaping the possibilities of communication (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949), a force that can never be fully controlled (Derrida 
1977) and, from a very different perspective, a force that can reach 
but also manipulate the many (Williams 1985) as much as it can 
be used as a weapon (Haraway 1991) to restructure our discourse. 
This chapter continues their productive suspicion that communica-
tion is always more than a transparent exchange of information. By 
looking into the specific case of digital technology, it explores the 
hypothesis that the rise of digital media is accompanied by a specif-
ic force, which differentiates it from other technologies. To enquire 
about this, it is necessary first to look into the theoretical setup of 
digital media. Can such a force also be located when it comes to 
digital technology?
When approaching this question, one quickly notices a rather 
confusing situation. Recent studies of digital technology (Bratton 
2016; Chun 2016; Crawford and Joler 2018; Gitelman 2013; 
Starosielski 2015) have rightly pointed out a feature specific to 
digital communication, which is shaped by a situation far more 
55complex than a “communication channel.” Bratton (2016) has most 
explicitly developed this thought, showing that the technical layers 
of the internet’s OSI architecture, by now grown into a network of 
planetary scale, can be described as a “stack.” To explore commu-
nication, different layers of this “stack” must be taken into account: 
the material communication layer providing energy and matter, 
controlled by an optimization layer and used by an application 
layer (53), for example. Here network communication challenges 
previous theories of software.
Being written in code, software has been organized by two strands 
of communication and, with it, two interfaces: one for the machine 
(an interface whose alienness Finn Brunton explores in chapter 1 
of this volume) and one for the user (an interface whose alienness 
I explore here). Their conflating layers are the reason why Wendy 
Chun (2011, 3), informed by her double degree in both systems 
design engineering and English literature, has called software “a 
notoriously difficult concept”:
Software perpetuates certain notions. . . . It does so by 
mimicking both ideology and ideology critique, by con-
flating executable with execution, program with process, 
order with action. Software, through programming lan-
guages that stem from a gendered system of command 
and control, disciplines its programmers and users, creat-
ing an invisible system of visibility. (Chun 2008, 316)
The disciplinary machine that software is affects programmers and 
users alike, as Chun points out. Following her, Alexander Galloway 
(2012) has addressed the interface as effect and ethos to make 
a similar point: interfaces do not simply transmit our messages; 
instead, they open— or enforce?— a very particular dialogue with 
technology, a point that needs to be pondered for a moment.
When discussing digital media, media theorists have often differed 
over where the force of digital technology originates. That there 
is a force, they agree— the algorithmic, as, for example, Rita Raley 
(2016) pointed out in her precise essay on algorithmic translation, 
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scholars have to look? Do they need to look at the code with which 
a programmer is communicating and to which Paula Bialski turns 
in chapter 3? Or is the force located in the graphical user interface 
communicating with the user? When approaching digital technol-
ogy, we too often follow “the logic of what lies beneath,” as Chun 
(2011, 20) notes, even though “code is also not always the source, 
because hardware does not need software to ‘do something’ ” 
(25). To make things even more complicated, further technological 
developments have stressed different parameters, such as data 
(Gitelman 2013) or machine learning architectures (Mackenzie 
2017), and more parameters at the moment still unknown will fol-
low. Thus, when looking at digital technology, this chapter assumes 
that for the process of communication, multiple interconnected 
layers are playing a part. Being interested in a very specific aspect 
of our dialogue with technology, however, this chapter does not 
focus on each of those layers but studies one particular moment: 
the moment when technology is addressing us. Whereas Brunton 
before me turns to Licklider to explore the complex setup that 
enables machines to communicate with each other, and Bialski in 
the next chapter turns to programmers to study the code review 
process, my chapter looks at the situation that enfolds when 
machines communicate with us. For this, it first needs to clarify its 
method of approaching technology.
As stated earlier, when technology communicates with us, it is 
not technology itself that raises its head and starts to speak— 
technology is not an acting subject. As Heidegger has pointed out, 
technology has also always been more than an object; that is, it 
has always been more than a means to an end. If it is neither a 
subject nor an object, however, how can in our case the force of 
communication regarding digital technology be approached? Here 
Hannah Arendt’s ([1958] 1998, 151) short take on the problem of 
technology, which she develops while discussing the transforma-
tion of human life through technology, points our thoughts in an 
interesting direction:
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that is, of the transformation of life and world through 
the introduction of the machine, has been strangely led 
astray through an all- too- exclusive concentration upon 
the service or disservice the machines render to men. 
The assumption here is that every tool and implement is 
primarily designed to make human life easier and human 
labor less painful. Their instrumentality is understood  
exclusively in this anthropocentric sense. But the instru-
mentality of tools and implements is much more closely 
related to the object it is designed to produce. (emphasis 
added)
Here Arendt states that any given technology is more closely 
related to another technology than to a human subject. To her, 
technology is driven by an immanent (“closer”) relation. This does 
not mean, however, that technology acts as a subject that masters 
the human. Humans play a part in the development of technology, 
which becomes clear in an “important assumption” added by Ar-
endt: “that the things of the world around us should depend upon 
human design and be built in accordance with human standards 
of either utility or beauty” (152). Pleading for human standards, 
Arendt shifts the focus onto technology in an interesting way. 
She approaches it more as a situation and less as a subject, which 
becomes explicit in the following quotation: “The question . . . is 
not so much whether we are the masters or the slaves of our ma-
chines, but whether machines still serve the world and its things” 
(151). This chapter follows her approach when studying the force of 
communication by investigating how technology as a situation can 
be thought of in more detail. What should be examined? How does 
a technical situation need to be studied? To answer these ques-
tions, the chapter links Arendt’s approach to Gilbert Simondon, 
with whom her take on technology resonates.
Like Arendt, Simondon (2017) finds our understanding of tech-
nology fundamentally flawed. Instead of emphasizing curiosity 
or understanding, Simondon critically remarks that our usual 
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(15). To overcome this, he rethinks this relation. In the chapter 
“Evolution of Technical Reality: Element, Individual, Ensemble,” he 
describes how technical evolution is not driven by men or machine 
but by an “ensemble” of the two. There is no master anymore who 
is in control of the process of a technical development. And this 
shift from a master relationship to an ensemble raises a question: 
instead of a gifted inventor or mad genius, what drives the devel-
opment of technology?
For Simondon, similar to Arendt, the answer lies in the productive 
relations between men and technology, which create a process of 
“concretisation” (Simondon 2017, 33; also Iliades 2015). He sees 
this, for example, in the development of X- ray tubes: regarding the 
Crooks tube and its later “successor,” the Coolidge tube, Simondon 
finds the engineer William Coolidge elaborating on technical func-
tions of the already existing Crooks tube. Coolidge “purified” them 
to improve the tube’s functioning— a process of concretizations in 
which specific aspects of an already existing technology get further 
developed: “the functions are thus purified by their dissociation, 
and the corresponding structures are more distinct and richer” 
(36). Instead of being struck by a flash of genius, it is the “technical 
reality” of the Crook tube that inspires the new product. Thus 
it is the technical reality itself that fosters further development, 
although this reality needs the human to concretize: “machines 
can neither think nor experience [vivre] their mutual relation; they 
can only act upon one another in actuality, according to causal 
schemes.” With this, the role of the human comes into play: “Man 
as witness to machines is responsible for their relation” (157).
Neither human nor technology can initiate the process of further 
development on its own. They need to relate to each other. With 
the human as an enabling witness, the relation of man and machine 
can be sketched as an ensemble instead of as an opposition. This 
puts the human in a very distinct role: the human is not master of 
machines digital or mechanic but their interpreter. In Simondon’s 
(2017, 150) words, “man understands machines; for there to be a 
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machines rather than above them” (see also Combes 2013, 57). 
Here the concrete technical relation of a technical object to its 
milieu describes an immanent development driven by “concreti-
sations” that are nondirectional. Fascinated by constant technical 
change, Simondon (2012, 13) will later describe technology as char-
acterized by an “opening”: “technical reality lends itself remarkably 
well to being continued, completed, perfected, extended.” Thus, in 
the middle of this, one finds an interesting tension: technology puts 
forth a situation that then needs a human to continue, complete, 
perfect, and extend it, in short, to turn it into reality. At the same 
time, technology follows its own, alien logic in what it offers to be 
continued, completed, perfected, and extended. We cannot predict 
the future of the technology we have invented. Even in the twenty- 
first century, in which we are facing a field as closely guarded as an 
economy driven by digital technology, we are never certain which 
technology will become the “next big thing.”
Technology is a force alien to us that has now started to speak 
and process language. But just because it has started to process 
language and can now say something, we should not mistake it 
for a speaker. Being with technology instead means to approach 
technology as a technological ensemble, as a continuously 
developing situation made up of humans and technology. Thus 
we need to study what kind of situation unfolds when technology 
communicates with us as we aim to avoid treating technology as 
an anthropocentric subject that acts and/or speaks. Luckily, a blue-
print for the power of communication that does not stem from a 
subject (although a subject is involved) can be found in the concept 
of interpellation Louis Althusser introduces when discussing the 
notion of ideology.
Althusser’s notion of ideology evolves around an interesting shift. 
While he analyzes communication (or interpellation), he does not 
look at what is said or what can be said. Instead, Althusser (2014) 
focuses on the situation created when being addressed and the 
force of this address. In his essay “Ideology and Ideological State 
60 Apparatuses,” he analyzes the structural force happening in the 
moment of communication. Using the example of a policeman 
calling out to you on the street, he illustrates that communication 
situates (even appropriates) its participants by establishing a 
link between sender and receiver in the act of interpellation: it 
constitutes a subject. His description of this constitution has turned 
into a highly influential theory of interpellation, although it is less a 
“theory” than just a few paragraphs. In those paragraphs, Althusser 
shows that a specific social role— in his words, a “subject”— comes 
into being by “the practical telecommunication of hailings” (264). 
To illustrate how this “hailing” or “interpellation” functions in the 
context of ideology Althusser introduces an individual that turns 
around in response to a policeman shouting “Hey, you there!” (264) 
to “answer” that call. And in exactly that moment, so Althusser, 
one becomes a subject relative to the ideology of law and crime. 
In other words, in that moment, one experiences the social force 
of communication, which Althusser calls ideology: “ideology 
‘acts’ or ‘functions’ in such a way that it ‘recruits’ subjects . . . . , or 
‘transforms’ the individuals into subjects . . . by that very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or hailing” (264).
In the twenty- first century, this operation of interpellation Althuss-
er described, an operation that creates a situation of recruitment 
by establishing a link between a sender and receiver, is still 
continuing. Only now, it can be found in new and different forms 
of communication— and this is the hypothesis I would like to bring 
to a test in this chapter: Today, the recruiting of subjects happens 
when technology addresses us. By interacting with the interfaces 
of technology, we are situated through this communication and 
recruited as specific subjects. Of course, that we make a world 
for others to live in through our technological creations has been 
an aspect in philosophy of technology, which Langdon Winner 
(1986, 17) but also Donna Haraway (1997) and many others have 
addressed in much detail. This chapter adds to those explorations 
of politics we built into our technologies, although it will be slightly 
shifting the view. By approaching technology with Arendt as a situa-
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ensemble (Simondon), it will not look at what is being said to us 
by technology. Instead, it is interested in the kind of situation that 
unfolds. As what kind of subject are we recruited in that situation? 
The next section therefore observes the communication with tech-
nology to tune into how something is being said when technology 
addresses us.
How	Is	Technology	Addressing	Us?
To capture how technology addresses us, this section analyzes 
three different examples partly drawing on earlier research (Bunz 
2015): it looks at the introduction of Apple’s iPad to study its early 
interface design, considers the brand communication of internet 
companies and their fondness of mascots, and, finally, turns to the 
Google Doodles that appear on the landing page of Google search, 
which one passes by when searching for other information.
On April 3, 2010, Apple’s cofounder, chairman, and chief executive 
officer unveiled a tablet computer it introduced as “iPad.” Its new 
product was operated via a touch screen and could play music, 
take photos, shoot video, and perform internet functions such as 
web browsing and emailing; more applications, from games to 
social networking, could be added. In its first fiscal year following 
the launch of the new product range, Apple sold 32 million iPads, 
with 140,000 apps being created for it by December 2011 (Econo-
mist 2011). One could say that with the success of the iPad, a new 
era in the relationship between human and computer materialized: 
the tablet computer showed that digital communication had left 
the workplace to become a commodity in our day- to- day lives. 
Computers had certainly entered leisure time with game consoles 
long before. The iPad, however, could be used for much more than 
just gaming. It could perform all tasks done by a personal office 
computer at that time, although it was not supposed for working. 
Its reduction to a large touch screen that weighed 680 grams  
made it comparable to a heavy book or magazine that could be 
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differentiated it from a computer as much as its specific user 
interface.
By that time, screens had been technically refined so that their 
visual interfaces no longer needed to be operated via minimal 
black- and- white icons. They could be replaced by touch screens 
with voluptuous 3D buttons more to the taste of Steve Jobs. As the 
former CEO of the animated film studio Pixar, he had a passion for 
reality imitating 3D graphics, as had Scott Forstall, the first architect 
of iOS, the software developed for the iPhone and iPad. Thus the 
early iPads had many 3D buttons and other skeuomorphic features 
each mimicking an original: the Notepad app had a border of 
stitched leather to make it look like a real notebook, the Podcasts 
app displayed a reel- to- reel tape deck when one pressed play, 
and the calendar and contacts apps looked like small books and 
featured a page- turn animation. Making apps and items mimic 
their real- world counterparts gave the iPad a stuffy look and 
feel. This continued in a different way Apple’s traditional appeal 
to nontechnical people. Right from the start, the company had 
established its computer as a fun- to- work- on machine by including 
features such as greeting users with a “happy Mac” when starting 
or by using symbols like the “dogcow” (indicating the setup of a 
page), scissors (for the cut command), or the trash can, which were 
created by Susan Kare for the back then still limited black- and- 
white screens. Now computers had entered a new, advanced, but 
also more serious era— at least that was the impression Apple gave 
with their design of the first iPad. Its look and feel communicated 
to the user that computers had come of age, although not for very 
long. Technically, all screens from phones to tablets to laptops to 
PCs were able to display complex, grown- up 3D interfaces. Still, 
a new and very different trend emerged that soon became more 
successful than mimetic skeuomorphism.
Surprisingly, the new trend was initiated by Apple’s rival Microsoft, 
which, after the iPhone’s success, had already been written off. 
Faced with the staggering success of Apple’s phone, Microsoft 
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handheld devices, the Microsoft designers decided to focus on 
cards and not on buttons. Eager to avoid Apple’s extensive use of 
skeuomorphism (Wingfield 2012), their inspirations came from 
the design principles of classic Swiss graphic design, which favors 
a minimal style, emphasizes typography, and uses a grid that 
can often be seen on European transportation signs. Instead of 
buttons, they used text placed on cards, which one could navigate 
laterally through scrolling canvases. Their typography- based design 
language came to be known as Microsoft design language. Its 
principles had originally been developed for Microsoft’s mobile 
media player Zune (2006– 8), before they were taken over to the 
Windows phone, launched in 2010. Although the device did not 
have the same success as the iPhone, its design would inspire 
others, Google among them— and Google’s logo in fact exemplifies 
this new and different approach to user communication.
While Apple’s skeuomorphic design for the iPad communicated its 
device as a toy- tool for grown- ups, the flat design Microsoft had 
initiated would go a very different way— and with it a new form of 
addressing the user would begin. Early on, Google would be part 
of this. On Wednesday, May 5, 2010, the search engine Google 
changed its logo for the first time in ten years and eleven months 
(Googleblog 2010). The new logo was less skeuomorphic and more 
colorful. Its three- dimensional letters in red, yellow, and blue, plus 
the green letter l based on the font Catull, lost their drop shadows. 
The logo had exchanged the rich details of skeuomorphism in their 
big typography with louder colors and simpler forms. Google’s 
senior user experience designer Wiley explained the change on the 
search engine’s blog as follows: “The new logo is lighter, brighter 
and simpler. We took the very best qualities of our design— 
personality and playfulness— and distilled them” (Googleblog 
2010). Experts agreed. Already before the change, British graphic 
designer Peter Saville, known for minimal design like the radio 
signal cover for Joy Division’s album Unknown Pleasures, described 
Google’s logo in an interview not just as playful. For him, it was 
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typeface, even the name” (cited in Rawsthorn 2010).
The redesign intensified this further. Chris Moran, then the 
Guardian’s search engine editorial optimizer, commented on the 
new look and feel as a turn toward “My First Search Engine” (pers. 
comm., May 6, 2010). Online, the rise of flat design had begun, 
even though it would take a while before its triumph over skeu-
omorphism became recognizable— it was not until 2013 that an 
animated web page displayed the “battle flat design vs. realism” 
(Intacto 2013). Flat design opposed skeuomorphic and other 
“artificial” design techniques in favor of two- dimensional, “flat” 
illustrations; big typography; and bright colors for a more simpli-
fied aesthetic. When the new design became a mainstream trend, 
however, something else changed— technology would approach 
the user in a different way. The new design style addressed a very 
different user— not an adult one. Visually, the style resembled 
books for very young children. Addressing the user as a very young 
child, however, was a transformation that did not happen abruptly 
and not just in one field. With hindsight, years before 2013, the new 
trend in brand design could have been spotted on the World Wide 
Web. And although it went unnoticed for a long time, it fundamen-
tally changed how brands approached the user.
Contemporary brand communication generally has a double func-
tion: it enables the user to identify a product and, for this, gives the 
product or service a specific identity or image (Millman 2012; Holt 
2004). With the internet, as many marketing books were eager to 
explain (Levine et al. 2000), brands had to become a conversation. 
But this was not the only novelty. Online, the rules seemed to 
be different, which is why several internet companies embraced 
animals (or aliens). Or was it because they addressed someone 
very different? In any case, if one attentively observed the brand 
communication of “online” products and services, one could notice 
that animals had peacefully appeared in large numbers. Next to 
the fox of the web browser Firefox chirped the blue bird of the mi-
croblogging service Twitter, while a little white alien with antennae 
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online conversations for “digital natives,” as they were dubbed. And 
not only platforms but also technology companies seemed to have 
a thing for mascots, from Tux, the penguin of the Linux operating 
system, to the black Octocat that had landed on the 404 pages of 
Github, the web- based hosting service for software development 
projects. And there were many more, like the bare- bellied chim-
panzee with a postman’s hat who helped create professional email 
for MailChimp; or the big- eyed brown owl that had become part of 
the logo of Hootsuite, a social media management dashboard; or 
the flying beaver that sat enthroned on the online travel page of a 
start- up company called Hipmunk. Even a nonmascot service like 
Facebook introduced a character, the Zuckasaurus, which looks 
“like a short Barney, the kid’s television show dinosaur” (Bilton 
2014). Standing on its two feet while checking its laptop, the blue 
dragonlike dinosaur was first spotted in April 2014, when it started 
to address users in a pop- up window with the educational concern 
that it “just wants to make sure you’re sharing this post with the 
right people” (Bilton 2014). In short, animated animals could be 
found all over the World Wide Web as if it were a fairy tale. Mascots 
had spread from sports, where they were supposed to bring luck to 
a team, to the internet, and academic books started to analyze the 
phenomenon (Brown and Ponsonby- McCabe 2014). In the offline 
world, brands that were targeting their products to adults generally 
refrained from using mascots; companies that produced cars, 
alcohol, or even entertainment electronics rarely considered an 
animated animal as part of their brand strategy.
Parallel to the appearance of the online mascots, a similar devel-
opment could be found on search pages: the rise of the Google 
Doodles, which introduced a new, unique style of commemoration 
that shared the same tendency. Until 2010, Google had only 
sporadically changed its prominent search website logo into those 
“Doodles” to mark an anniversary or event. Although the concept 
of the Doodle was born at the very start of the company (1998), 
when founders Larry Page and Sergey Brin changed the logo with 
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in the Nevada desert, the logo was not changed very often. It took 
two years before they requested a second change to honor Bastille 
Day, commemorating the beginning of the French Revolution each 
year on July 14. Before 2010, the logo was changed only on rare 
occasions. Then one could find a sketch that playfully intertwined 
the topic of an event with the logo: the birthday of English math-
ematician Ada Lovelace, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, or Halloween. 
After 2010, the frequency with which Doodles replaced the logo 
intensified. In 2010, Google published thirty- five Google Doodles, 
more than in any previous year. In the years 2011 and 2012, this 
number went up to seventy- six and eighty- three, respectively, and 
has gone up ever since. More and more Doodles displayed events 
or presented persons shaping human history and culture with 
imaginative cuteness. They started to appear worldwide, thereby 
taking national cultures into account: Britain celebrated the eight- 
hundredth anniversary of the Magna Carta (2015), Mexico the Day 
of the Dead (2013), and the United States the Mexican Hollywood 
actress Katy Jurado (2018).
Considering that Google is now an essential part of our public 
sphere— the Court of Justice of the European Union (2014) 
indicated this by its ruling that natural persons have the right to be 
forgotten and links to personal data must be erased in this public 
space— Google Doodles are the monuments we find in it. As we 
pass by those monuments when searching, we are reminded of 
important moments that have shaped our human fate. This form 
of commemoration, however, happens in a rather unique way, dif-
ferent from historic monuments cast in stone and erected on our 
public squares, which foster a certain symbolism and spread an air 
of pathos. Indeed, most public monuments in stone or bronze are 
slightly pathetic, from the Statue of Liberty enlightening the world 
from Liberty Island in Manhattan to the Soviet War Memorial in 
Berlin’s Treptower Park to the Monument of the People’s Heroes 
in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square to Christ the Redeemer in Rio de 
Janeiro cresting Corcovado mountain. Online Doodle monuments, 
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imaginative cuteness and are supposed to be “fun” (Google Doo-
dles Archive 2018). It should come as no surprise that they more 
often commemorate birthdays than deaths.
Before judging Google Doodles as “history light,” however, it is 
important to take a step back and get a full view of the transfor-
mation. Certainly all three developments— the rises of flat design, 
brand mascots, and Google Doodles— show a common tendency, 
as their style is equally defined by colorful surfaces, big typography, 
and playful stories or mascots, thereby resembling elements we 
are familiar with from children’s books or apps. Thus what is the 
specific form of interpellation that can be noticed here? How is 
technology addressing us? To state the obvious, online technology 
has started to address us as if we were children. The extent of this 
infantilization, however, only comes fully into view when compar-
ing the described design tendency to an older project designed 
by Dieter Rams, who helped the company Braun to relaunch an 
educational toy called Lectron; and like many of his other designs, 
it became iconic.
Lectron was a modular electronic experimentation kit designed 
to introduce youth to basic electronic circuits and theory. From 
1967 on, the German designer and his team, among them Jürgen 
Greubel, produced the packaging in a new style, including a 
redesign of all manuals. Being supervised by Rams, it is not very 
surprising that the Braun Lectron Hobby Set Radio Receiver (1969) 
is kept in a minimal style. Contrary to the users of Google’s search 
engine, Apple’s iPad, or the service online brands, however, it does 
not target adult users. As a game, it is tailored to a much younger 
age group. So how does Lectron approach its teenage user?
The cardboard box cover shows three photographs. Two smaller 
ones display the white radio set in Rams’s minimal design and a 
detail of a printed circuit board; the bigger photo pictures a black- 
haired teenager in a buttoned- up blue shirt, who sits in front of 
components and tools soldering electric parts. Lectron approaches 
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the technically interested and capable teenager. Contemporary 
flat design, on the other hand, incorporates design elements for 
a much younger age group. Its colorful surfaces, big typography, 
and animated characters are generally design elements used for 
targeting children aged two to seven— a time during which children 
are in the sensorimotor stage. Children in this stage, as the child 
psychologist Jean Piaget has shown, assign active roles to things in 
their environment (animism), while their activities are mainly cate-
gorized by symbolic play and manipulating symbols. It is a stage in 
[Figure 2.1] The Hobby Set Radio Receiver design by Dieter Rams and Jürgen Greubel, 
1967. Photograph by dasprogramm.
69which physical operations are more dominant than mere “mental” 
operations. Thus the conclusion is obvious: we are addressed by 
technology as very young children.
Fighting back the natural reaction to all miscategorizations (feeling 
insulted), this is an interesting outcome to be investigated further 
by shifting our attention back to the aspect Althusser had in mind 
when discussing being addressed as a form of power. So what is 
the effect of this infantilization of user interfaces? What force or 
form of power play are we facing here? For that we face a form of 
power play can almost be taken for granted— when technology is 
communicating with us in this way, it is surely not just transmitting 
the friendliness of cuddly Silicon Valley companies that commis-
sioned plush toy– like interfaces to comfort us in the exhausting 
world we live in. To understand this manipulation further, the next 
section categorizes this infantilization.
How	We	Are	Getting	Manipulated
Technology has always manipulated us (Winner 1989, 19), and it 
does this more openly than ever, since it has started to speak. For 
this, one does not even need to turn to conversational interfaces, 
such as Apple’s Siri or Amazon’s Alexa, quarreling with us if the 
lights should be on or off. This also can be easily noticed by anyone 
who has been disciplined by a car’s navigation system. In fact, Glob-
al Positioning System (GPS) usage is a good example of a simple 
form of manipulation, as it has turned into quite a dominant sys-
tem. To get their exact position, smartphones and millions of other 
devices use GPS, which was launched 1978 by the U.S. government. 
The system’s Master Control Station is located in the Schriever Air 
Force Base near Colorado Springs, overseeing thirty- two GPS satel-
lites (U.S. Naval Observatory 2018). Currently only Russia operates 
an alternative system, GLONASS, with Europe and China working 
on further alternatives. But most cars and smartphone maps use 
the GPS signal, which is then correlated to a road or a calculated 
route. The route, however, does not always coincide with reality. A 
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63 percent of those who use GPS say that it has led them astray at 
least once by pointing them in the wrong direction— and some of 
us obey those directions more than others.
In the United Kingdom, a driver continued to follow the navi’s 
instructions, which told him the narrow, steep path he was driving 
on in Todmorden, West Yorkshire, was a road. He only noticed the 
mistake after he struck a fence and his BMW hung off the edge of a 
cliff. In South Brunswick, New Jersey, a driver ignored the end of a 
road because it was differently displayed on his navigation system. 
Following the navi’s version of reality, he ignored a stop sign and 
hit a house. In Australia, three Japanese tourists drove their car into 
the Pacific Ocean. Their navi had told them there was a road to the 
North Stradbroke Island. After five hundred meters, they got stuck 
in the mud, their car being flooded by the tide. In Bergün, Switzer-
land, the navigation system told a man to turn onto a trail. The trail 
was for goats. The minivan that he had driven up that trail could 
only reach the road again with the help of a heavy- lift helicopter. In 
Italy, two Swedish tourists drove four hundred miles to the wrong 
Capri. Instead of relaxing on the island with its blue grotto, they 
ended up in an industrial city in Italy’s northern region that bears 
the same name. In all cases, human judgment was distorted by 
technology, it seems. But the dialogue between human drivers and 
advising technology only looks at first sight like a master discourse, 
in which human servants blindly follow a directing technology. 
Technology, as both Simondon and Arendt have reminded us, 
is not necessarily an opposing force that aims to bring humans 
under control and is wrongly thought of through the template of 
master and servant. After all, in the preceding cases, the advice of 
technology could have easily been ignored. Thus one could also 
say that in most cases, the drivers, often tourists who were not 
familiar with their environment, followed “their” technology instead 
of asking other humans for help. In other words, we are part of this 
manipulation— and the same is the case when we look at patroniz-
ing, talkative self- service checkouts.
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outs early was the United Kingdom. By 2015, Tesco, the United 
Kingdom’s largest supermarket chain, had already introduced 
twelve thousand of them. To help shoppers understand how to 
operate the new technology, the checkouts give verbal guidance 
on how to use them. And their most renowned comment in their 
early phase became “Unexpected item in bagging area. Remove 
this item before continuing.” The reason for this comment: its 
pay mechanism has integrated scales. It weighs the item after it is 
placed in the grocery bag; this is done to ensure that the shopper 
pays for all the items in the basket. The problem is, however, that 
the system gets easily irritated, for example, when an item is too 
light and the second scale fails to recognize it. In these cases, the 
checkout announces loudly that there is an “unexpected item in 
bagging area” and soon after starts nervously flashing a light and 
an alarm sound for everyone to hear and see— the system calls for 
help, as it needs the reassurance of an assistant. Does it accuse 
you of being too thick to use it? Or suspect you of being a thief who 
has just stolen something? Being addressed by it in an Althusserian 
manner— “Hey you, there!”— we react annoyed. We recognize that 
other humans who see and hear this might put us into the category 
of social subjects who have problems using a self- service checkout, 
which is not very flattering.
Here we experience manipulation: when making you behave in the 
right manner or advising you to do the right thing, both the self- 
checkout and the car navigation assistant are forms of disciplinary 
manipulation, in contrast to those open forms of manipulation we 
find with infantilization, which do not directly tell you what to do. 
This seems to be of a different kind, with its interface not disciplin-
ing us but simply suggesting a situation. Cheerful design signals a 
simple and unproblematic context. By addressing us as very young 
children, the playful interfaces of flat design suggest that there is 
no need to understand anything. Just try it: go press this button, 
speak to it, create! The simple but colorful appearance signals that 
the users can be free from second thoughts about the complexity 
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the world we live in.
We are manipulated into a situation we seemingly don’t have to 
question— and this is why we should pause. For we have reached 
our first conclusion: having looked at how technology is addressing 
us, this chapter could establish that it is recruiting us as very 
young children. But can we really read the situation as technology 
concealing its mode of operation to lure us into its unquestioned 
usage? Would this not mean that we have positioned ourselves 
again in opposition to technology? After all, this chapter does not 
plan to study the concealed interests of technology companies. 
Instead, it aims to analyze and understand our being with technol-
ogy by analyzing our current dialogue with it through looking into 
its actual “concretization” (Simondon 2017); indeed, Simondon 
discussed the intuitive approach of children toward technology as 
one way of understanding the being of technology: “One cannot 
study the status of the technical object in a civilization without tak-
ing into account the difference between the relation of this object 
to the adult and to the child,” he writes (106). The technical training 
of the child is based on practicing with technology bringing forth a 
“technical subconscious” (107), which can also be understood as an 
intuitive skill. This experimental skill is a certain intuitive mode of 
technical knowledge also linked to “experts”; Simondon names the 
operational knowledge of farmers or of craftsmen about the ma-
terial they work with. Their technical training consists of “intuition 
and purely operative schemas that are very difficult to formulate or 
transmit through any kind of symbolism” (107). Instead of scientific 
knowledge, the operational knowledge is created through technical 
realization:
Technical realization, on the contrary, provides the scien-
tific knowledge that serves as its principle of functioning, 
in the form of a dynamic intuition that can even be ap-
prehended by the young child, and which is susceptible 
to becoming more and more elucidated, doubled by a 
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encylopedism could thus find its place in the education 
of the child without requiring capacities for abstraction, 
which the young child does not fully have at its dispos-
al. In this sense, the child’s acquisition of technological 
knowledge can initiate an intuitive encyclopedism, 
grasped through the nature of the technical object. (124)
Following Simondon, and linking his understanding of intuitive 
encyclopedism to our problem if being recruited as very young 
children, one could therefore also understand the “call” of 
technology as an invitation to learn about a digital interface. We, 
however, read this dialogue according to the idea that technology 
is manipulating us into being its slave users, which seems to be a 
rather anthropomorphic reading of technology: it treats technology 
as if it were a human in the role of an acting subject. As pointed out 
earlier, technology has agency and is a force, but to understand 
the alienness of this force means to remind ourselves that it is not 
a human subject that follows a Hegelian interest to subjugate and 
control other humans.1 Technology creates specific situations— in 
this we can find its force— but when creating those situations, it 
does not follow a specific interest, and this is exactly why Donna 
Haraway (1991, 161) in “A Cyborg Manifesto” sees the potential for 
“rearrangements in world- wide social relations tied to science and 
technology.” What is created by technology can always be inter-
preted in different ways— if its force is understood. Even Marcuse 
(1998, 42), whose take on technology is generally rather critical, 
writes that “technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well 
as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as 
the abolition of toil.” Technology is not neutral— its force is that it 
confronts us with a specific situation or a specific transformation; 
how this transformation is interpreted, however, and which con-
cretization is going to appear is always adapted by us humans,  
as we are part of the technical ensemble. To say it with Donna 
Haraway: “We’re living in a world of connections— and it matters 
which ones get made and unmade” (cited in Kunzru 1997).
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although without interest) to our childish dialogue with technology, 
reading this dialogue through Simondon’s approach of an intuitive 
encyclopedism, we can still find a negative effect of our infantiliza-
tion: the creation of a situation that does not need to be further 
questioned. But can the recruitment of technology addressing 
us in an infantilizing manner be thought of differently? Can we 
move beyond the template of master and servant? To follow this 
question, the next section explores infantilization from a different 
perspective, by looking at an advertisement of the company that 
created the style of flat design: Microsoft.
In 2014, Microsoft aired its first national Super Bowl advertisement, 
a one- minute video produced mainly in- house. Using Microsoft 
products, it explores technology through the eyes of Steve Gleason, 
a former NFL player who is battling ASL, a severe illness that 
attacks nerve cells in the brain and spinal cord that control muscle 
movement. At the beginning of the video, we hear a computer- 
generated voice asking, “What is technology?” and see it being 
written by Steve Gleason, who sits in a wheelchair with a keyboard 
he operates via eye movements. We see a girl playing with a 
red windmill. From there, the commercial cuts to symbols that 
resemble written code, followed by Microsoft’s colorful card screen 
design. Then a surgeon is flipping through large medical images 
displayed on a wall using hand gestures, followed by a white toy 
robot, which is about to look at us, as the camera movement sug-
gests. Gleason’s next question can be seen and heard: “What can 
it do?” after which a small boy enters the screen playing baseball 
standing on two artificial legs, followed by the ninety- eight- year- old 
painter Hal Lasko, partially blind, painting a colorful landscape 
with the help of a mouse. Again, Gleason’s artificial voice is asking, 
“How far can we go?” We see pictures of a satellite in the universe, 
a surgeon using his hand to control an X- ray, and two groups of 
children cheering each other via a video- chat projection. After this 
introductory period, the next thirty seconds are grouped around 
a theme showing the examples of the “power” of technology, as 
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his child; a small child freaking out with joy when she sees her dad 
on the screen; several scientific and medical successes, from the 
launch of a rocket to a man with an artificial arm moving his hand 
and the emotional reaction of a women making remote contact 
with someone on the other side of the screen. It ends with the 
slogan “It has given voice to the voiceless,” showing Gleason in his 
high- technology wheelchair, a computer helping him communicate, 
his son on his lap, to whom he now connects directly by raising his 
eyebrows. The main slogan appears— “Empowering us all”— to be 
replaced after a few seconds by Microsoft’s logo.
The commercial is informed by the topic that frames it— how tech-
nology helps, “empowers,” those we love and care for to lead better 
lives— and certainly appeals to our emotions. The majority of the 
situations depicted in this video are related to health and science. 
Thus the situations visualized mainly pertain to health or science— 
generally areas not dominated by children. The video, however, 
uses nearly as many images of children (as individuals and in 
groups) as of adults. A content analysis2 shows nine sequences 
with the focus on children and twelve with the focus on adults. The 
reason for images of curious, excited, and playful children lies part-
ly in the task of every commercial: to create appealing images. But 
there is more to it. That children are playfully discovering technol-
ogy is also symbolic. This becomes apparent when Gleason’s first 
question opening the video— “What is technology?”— is followed by 
a sequence showing a small girl in a dress curiously looking at the 
windmill she puts into motion with her small hand: humans explor-
ing technology. The message of a girl putting a windmill into play 
(its movement enhanced by a sound effect) is visually answering 
this question. Moving a windmill means exploring technology. The 
usage itself is an act of exploration— and empowering.
Of course, one can argue that this is a message in the interest 
of Microsoft: the sheer usage of its commercial products is 
empowering— and not programming code yourself, as, for exam-
ple, open source software would allow. Being able to understand 
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Still, this does not fully explain why the question “What is tech-
nology?” finds a fitting visual sequence in a child playing with a 
windmill. Instead of asking what a windmill has to do with digital 
media or Microsoft, the sequence makes sense. Linking this image 
to theories of learning and its role for the history of graphic user 
interfaces, the next section aims to explain why this could be  
the case.
Logic	Is	Not	a	Derivative	of	Language
The graphical user interface has become a commercial success, 
although this took several experiments, among them Douglas 
Engelbart’s NLS system, Ivan Sutherland’s Sketchpad, SGI’s Iris, 
the two interfaces of the Xerox Alto and Xerox Star, and the Apple 
Lisa and Apple Macintosh. As such, it is generally referred to as the 
transformation that helped personal computers to become main-
stream (e.g., Chun 2011, 59). Its advantage: it is easier to use than a 
command line interface. Therefore the graphic interface appeals to 
users not familiar with coding. This section aims to inquire what it 
is that makes it easier and how this is linked to the girl playing with 
a windmill. To show this, it is first necessary to compare the older 
command line interface with the newer graphical user interface 
with respect to learning. In principle, both interfaces have the same 
function: they are ways to command a program. How they ap-
proach the user, however, is different. A graphical user interface’s 
windows, icons, menus, and pointer are intuitive elements, where-
as the knowledge to operate the command line needs to be learned 
beforehand. A graphical user interface can be operated without 
much knowledge as it incorporates the learning into its usage. Learn-
ing theories in fact played an important role in its development. 
Discussing the work of mathematician Seymour Papert (1963, 
1968), who collaborated closely with child psychologist Jean Piaget 
and also influenced the computer scientist Alan Kay, this section 
takes a look at the connection of learning theories to computer 
science in general and the graphical user interface in particular.
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had come across theories of learning by child psychologist Jean 
Piaget. The South African had met Piaget when he spent time 
in Paris as part of his second doctorate in St. John’s College in 
Cambridge and decided to follow him to his Institute in Geneva to 
apply his theories to artificial intelligence, a field that found itself 
in its golden years from 1956 to 1974, driven by new discoveries 
and funding. More precisely, Papert’s aim was to enhance machine 
learning by incorporating Piaget’s ideas of the learning of children, 
although their interest was mutual: Piaget endorsed Papert’s cyber-
netic approach and published many of his articles in his journal 
Études d’Épistemologie Génétique. Known today as a child psycholo-
gist, he understood himself as a scholar of epistemology exploring 
theories of knowledge with the aim to establish a new approach 
toward understanding. And it would be the graphical user interface 
that would pick up this approach to show that children’s learning 
can indeed be applied to adults’ learning too.
Interested in multiple ways of knowing, Piaget turned to children’s 
learning as a unique form of interacting and theorizing. Curious 
about their thinking, he took their logical reasoning seriously, even 
when their thinking led to “wrong” answers. His nonjudgmental ap-
proach enabled him to describe four universal stages of cognitive 
development that are still relevant to contemporary psychology. 
More important in the context of this argument, however, is 
something different: central to his approach was the hypothesis 
that for human understanding and learning, the act of reasoning 
(the work of the mind) is as important as practical or experimental 
understanding (the work of the fingers and mind together). When 
observing children between the ages of two and seven, Piaget rec-
ognized a specific way in which children play. He saw in children’s 
sensorimotor approach a form of learning— thinking with fingers— 
most important when we are very young children. From this, he 
concluded that logic is formed not only in the brain:
I believe that logic is not a derivative of language. The 
source of logic is much more profound. It is the total 
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or ordering things, etc. This is what logical– mathematical 
experience is. (Piaget 1972, 13; see also Piaget 1969, 90)
Piaget developed what has come to be known as constructivism, 
an approach that viewed learning as a reconstruction rather than 
as a transmission of knowledge. It valued experience highly and 
understood playing— the manipulating of materials— as a way to 
create knowledge:
To know an object, to know an event, is not simply to 
make a mental copy, or image, of it. To know an object is 
to act on it. To know is to modify, to transform the object, 
and to understand the process of this transformation, 
and as a consequence to understand the way the object is 
constructed. . . . In other words, it is a set of actions mod-
ifying the object, and enabling the knower to get at the 
structures of the transformation. (Piaget 1972, 20)
To apply and automate this approach to machine learning, Papert 
(1963) developed a project called “genetron,” which explored the 
learning of algorithms by allowing them to build their own network 
topologies that simulated qualitative and quantitative developmen-
tal change (Shultz et al. 2008; Minsky and Papert 1969). He was 
later assisted by Marvin Minsky, with whom he cofounded MIT’s 
Artificial Intelligence Lab. Despite support from MIT, the project 
struggled with technical limitations (Shultz et al. 2008). But Papert 
had also started to approach the relation of child and machine 
through another angle, manipulating not the machine’s learning 
but children’s learning. Applying Piaget’s theory, the aim here was 
to allow a coordination of actions— acting with an object— to initi-
ate learning in children: learning to operate a computer. Together 
with his colleagues Wally Feurzig and Cynthia Solomon, Papert 
developed LOGO, an educational dialect of the functional program-
ming language Lisp, which was used to command first a virtual 
turtle, then a small turtle- shaped robot that could move and draw. 
And it was this approach that would inspire Papert’s colleague 
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children but also for “children of all ages.”
When he met Papert, Alan Kay was a young, creative computer 
scientist who had thought about the graphical user interface ever 
since he was a student— the first thing his supervisor gave him 
to read was Ivan Sutherland’s description of the Sketchpad, one 
of the first interactive computer graphics programs. But it was 
watching children in schools using Papert’s LOGO that enabled a 
breakthrough:
Here were children doing real programming with a 
specially designed language and environment. . . . This 
encounter finally hit me with what the destiny of per-
sonal computing really was going to be. Not a personal 
dynamic vehicle, as in Engelbart’s metaphor opposed to 
the IBM “railroads,” but something much more profound: 
a personal dynamic medium. With a vehicle one could 
wait until high school and give “drivers ed,” but if it was a 
medium, it had to extend into the world of childhood. (Kay 
1996, 523, emphasis added)
Kay understood that the logic of the world of childhood could be 
extended to adults by reapplying visual thinking to an adult inter-
face. Reading (besides Piaget) the educationalists Jerome Bruner 
and Maria Montessori had convinced him that not the command 
line but visual thinking and a more iconic approach (531– 32) would 
shape future ways of operating a computer. His insights culminat-
ed in his proposal “A Personal Computer for Children of All Ages” 
(Kay 1972), which described a portable educational computer to be 
commanded by experimental actions. It was based on a program 
that came to be known as Smalltalk, a program “environment in 
which users learn by doing” (547). Via Papert, Piaget’s insight that 
logic can be a coordination of actions had found its way to Kay’s 
interface; Kay saw Piaget’s thesis confirmed: “Just doing seems 
to help” (547)— a seismic shift. With the graphical user interface, 
experimental thinking started to assist linguistic thinking. And with 
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proach information, an approach based on experimental as much 
as on linguistic logic. Relying on a logic we use in Western culture 
primarily when we are very young, interfaces address us as very 
young children. Users of graphical interfaces are asked to apply 
an experimental logic, which means to learn to understand the 
interface via a set of actions. Ever since the rise of digital media, the 
devices that inhabit our kitchens or gardens have stopped asking 
us to read through the manual before being switched on for the 
first time.
The infantilization of interfaces does not necessarily mean that 
technology is becoming smart while we are declared stupid. The 
manipulative dialogue of today’s interfaces is not necessarily an 
act to deceive the user. Reaching out to a human logic mostly 
used in childhood, similar to the way Kay’s and Papert’s interfaces 
functioned, the playful addressing of the user can also be read as 
an invitation to experiment. In experimenting, in playing with the 
windmill, we use digital technology. Using it, however, means to 
understand how to act on it— acquire the skill to use its force— 
thereby entering into a dialogue with that technology. Entering into 
this dialogue is important not just for the case of the graphical user 
interface but also for artificial intelligence and machine learning, 
about which Shan Carter and Michael Niessen (2017) have argued 
that its new form of computing must be linked to a new and 
different interface to fully unfold its operational knowledge. To 
bring forth this operational knowledge in a more general sense, 
digital technology is calling upon us as children. It is not addressing 
us as adults, as engineers. To call into action an intuitive, visual- 
operational knowledge, marginalized in our postindustrial Western 
societies, it is recruiting us as children of all ages. The force of 
communication we face in digital technology is an operational 
knowledge; to make use of it, we are being framed as very young 
children.
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The hypothesis that digital technology finds itself linked to a spe-
cific force could be shown; still the analysis cannot stop here. For 
within this force, an interesting setup of power relations unfolds, 
power relations that are coming into action when we communicate 
using digital interfaces. Is the infantilization of interfaces inviting us 
to experiment with those interfaces, or is it luring us into a playful 
situation that is not to be intellectually questioned? To understand 
our contemporary being with technology, another effort needs to 
be made to explore the lines of power that run through it. How 
do we know if a digital interface is addressing us with the aim of 
empowerment, or deceiving and sedating us? How can one con-
ceive the difference? This is the difficulty when it comes to being 
addressed as children: the infantilization of interfaces is able to be 
both patronizing and empowering simultaneously— the power we 
find within the force of communication refrains from following a 
well- behaved dialectical thinking.
Being patronizing and empowering means that one cannot be for 
or against infantilization. Being for the user’s emancipation does 
not equal being against infantilization. The conceptual architecture 
we find at work here does not unfold in an oppositional way. An 
interface can be both patronizing and empowering in the same 
moment and is therefore not fitting into the antagonistic concept 
of dialectics, thesis and antithesis. Questioning the phenomenon of 
the infantilization of interfaces further with regard to the powers at 
play here, however, one also can realize that at the same time, an 
antagonistic, dialectic relation is not completely gone: an interface 
can be patronizing and empowering at the same time, although 
to be patronizing and to be empowering remain fundamentally 
different acts of power. While empowering users means that we 
are learning to use the power of technologies ourselves, patroniz-
ing guides and shoves us toward just acting out that power. One 
time the power is with the user; the other time the power is just 
lent to the user— in other words, there is still a fundamentally 
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a negative relation, this complex force of negativity that has been 
described by Susan Coole (2002) and Benjamin Noys (2010) for 
thinking/acting difference is still at play, ensuring that there is 
difference.
From this follows that, again, we need to try coming to grips with 
the force of communication and the forms of power we find in its 
act of infantilizing the user. For this, the last section of this text 
turns to the inspiration of a visual, operational knowledge (inspired 
by Alan Kay and Gilbert Simondon) which it finds in the concept of 
“diffraction” as it appears in and has been visualized for quantum 
mechanics. Diffraction describes the phenomenon of waves 
interfering with each other, although differences remain, much like 
in Thomas Young’s image from 1803 (Figure 2.2) showing a two- slit 
diffraction.
The double- slit experiment with two waves interfering has become 
the thought experiment that is expressing puzzles of quantum 
mechanics, such as the wave– particle duality. In this century, 
diffraction also resurfaced as an interesting concept to think dif-
ference and was explored in depth in the writings of Karen Barad.3 
Inspired by particle diffraction of quantum trajectories, such as 
[Figure 2.2.] Thomas Young’s sketch of two- slit diffraction presented to the Royal 
Society in 1803.
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physics developed the method of reading of insights through one 
another that came to be known as the method of diffraction. Barad 
(2007, 137) is interested in the phenomenon of diffraction as it 
allows her to think differences not as essentials but as a process. 
Diffractive patterns are always fundamentally linked to the agential 
apparatus that produces them, and vice versa: “Changing patterns 
of difference are neither pure cause nor pure effect; indeed, they 
are that which effects, or rather enacts, a causal structure, differ-
entiating cause and effect.” Here I’d like to take up Barad’s aim of 
deessentalizing difference but to mirror and link it to the difficulties 
in differentiating the two modes in infantilization, that is, to be 
empowering and patronizing at the same time. The circumstance 
of infantilization’s two effects— empowering and patronizing— 
resembles diffraction: two waves that overlap to build a diffractive 
pattern. The particles/waves overlap while the waves still can be 
differentiated. Thus, as the image shows, despite them overlap-
ping, there can still be difference. Or in other words, a diffractive 
pattern, as we find it within the phenomenon of infantilization, 
does not mean its effects cannot be differentiated. Following Barad 
further, we therefore ask the question again: how can one conceive 
this overlapping difference?
As Barad stresses, to understand diffraction, to know what kind 
of diffraction is the case, it is important to look further than just 
noticing that there is a pattern: “Crucially, diffraction effects are at-
tentive to fine detail” (91). It is here where we find an aspect central 
to her approach: the detail. In her own words: “Attention to fine 
details is a crucial element of this methodology” (92). One has to be 
“sufficiently attentive to the details” and is “thinking through the de-
tails” (73), because “fine- grained details matter” (90). It is the “level 
of detail” (42) that enables one to answer a question. Thus it is to 
the detail she looks to situate difference: “Small details can make 
profound differences” (92). While the interference of the waves is a 
given— otherwise, there would be no diffraction— the way a diffrac-
tion pattern looks can vary as it is linked to its parameters: “If any 
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different” (91). Only when looking at the details of the pattern and 
studying the “concrete” effects does one understand what exactly 
has been produced and which tendency of both— empowering or 
patronizing— precedes.
Unsurprisingly, pointing out those ambiguities and exploring their 
details also has become a habit of media and technology scholars 
interested in describing social formations. For this, theorists of 
digital technology and media have questioned word pairs like 
public– private, global– local, free– controlled, nature– technology, 
and work– play. Once understood as antithetical, they have made 
clear that their conceptual relation does not seem to be essentially 
oppositional anymore. Tiziana Terranova (2004) was among the 
first to discuss the ambiguity of work– play, pointing out that 
commenting online on platforms is free labor playing in the hands 
of companies looking for profit, although it remains pleasurable— a 
paradox. Wendy Chun (2011) also showed early that digital media 
is spreading democratic freedom along with the fact that it also ac-
celerates the potential for global surveillance— an observation she 
later extended into digital media entering our daily habits, thereby 
messing “with the distinction between publicity and privacy, gossip 
and political speech, surveillance and entertainment, intimacy 
and work, hype and reality” (Chun 2016, ix). Analyzing algorithmic 
security practices and data technologies, Claudia Aradau and 
Tobias Blanke (2018) have disclosed how the dichotomies of 
normality– abnormality, friend– enemy, and identity– difference have 
been fundamentally reconfigured. Looking at the matter of media, 
Jussi Parikka (2015) dissects the opposition of nature– technology, 
which brings out the dependency of today’s media from nature 
(Parikka 2015). Traversing computer science with a philosophical 
perspective, Luciana Parisi (2015) has questioned today’s critique 
of instrumental rationality, pointing out that incomputability 
and randomness need to be conceived as the very condition of 
computation and not instrumentality. Pointing out dependence in a 
networked age, Anna Watkins Fisher (2016) discusses interventions 
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their employees master problems created through being exploited 
by the very same corporations. One could add Nicole Starosielski 
(2015), Christopher Kelty (2012), N. Katherine Hayles’s (2017) study 
of the cognitive nonconscious, and many more whose recent 
books or essays discuss how to deal with the ambiguities of new 
media and the paradoxes we live with— the force digital technology 
confronts us with.
These examples show that digital technology in the twenty- first 
century is characterized by a dialectical setting in which disparate 
aspects no longer operate in an oppositional mode, although their 
dialectical relation has not collapsed—one is the flip side of the 
other. Such a setting, in relation to the work of Pheng Cheah (2010), 
could be described as “nondialectical dialectics.” Nondialectical 
as an interface that is addressing us as a very young child is both 
patronizing and empowering and dialectic, as both moments are 
still marked by an antagonistic relation, with one enabling the use 
of power while the other is just lending it. Thus, regarding digital 
technology, the task we face is to understand how to adjust the 
frame in a way that fortifies the waves of empowering by turning to 
the fine details. It is not to choose the right side.
This chapter set out to study a force and found it linked to a figure 
of power that it described as “nondialectical dialectics.” Interested 
in understanding how technology is addressing us, it aimed to 
explore how a specific force unfolds in digital communication. 
Drawing on Althusser’s theory of interpellation, it identified a 
particular situation opening up when being addressed by digital 
technology communicating with us: digital interfaces, which aim to 
reach a general user, show a tendency of infantilization. By drawing 
on design elements from a child’s world, such as big typography, 
primary colors, big buttons, and animated mascots, those inter-
faces are addressing their users as young children, thereby calling 
upon an experimental– operational knowledge rather than an 
encyclopedic– scientific one. This type of knowledge, as could be 
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of graphical user interfaces, which Alan Kay or Samuel Papert 
conceptualized and built, inspired by the educational research of 
Jean Piaget, who believed that the coordination of actions ordering 
and joining things together should also be understood as “logical– 
mathematical experience.”
In this operational dialogue with digital technology, however, a new 
phenomenon could be seen: it is not in a strict sense defined by a 
dialectical logic of right or wrong dialogues with technology— and 
in this lies the political sticking point. An interface that invites us to 
an experimental dialogue exploring it can be empowering, while 
it is not far from an interface that simply suggests how to use it 
best without the user gaining any deeper knowledge about it (but 
getting things done quickly). In other words, advising interfaces 
that address us as children can but do not have to be empowering— 
the force of digital technology that came into view could and 
does go both ways. The cases analyzed here, from historic Google 
Doodles to flat, colorful buttons on touch screens, are examples of 
infantilization that show that the way digital technology is address-
ing us is deeply ambiguous. Digital technology can produce two or 
more antagonistic effects at the same time and can therefore be 
described as being nondialectical. Still, a dialectic relation remains, 
as the effects it produces can be considered antagonistic with one 
being the flip side of the other. Only when turning to the details 
(Barad 2007), only when analyzing the actual effects, can the actual 
political scale be understood.
The force of communication that then comes into view is a com-
plicated, ambiguous one. It is a challenge— a challenge because 
it is nondialectical while producing political effects; a challenge 
because it has agency but is not an acting subject. When thinking 
the force of digital technology, it helps to avoid understanding it in 
an anthropomorphic way and to instead call upon its alien logic. So 
I end this text with seconding what Finn Brunton pointed out in the 
first chapter, who was preparing us for an alien dialogue in which 
we find ourselves always already.
87Notes
Without Wendy Chun’s invitation and feedback on this contribution to, first, 
the Terms of Media II conference at Brown University and then to this volume, 
this text would not exist. Indeed, the text owes a lot to her encouragement 
here (and in other situations). I also owe warm thanks to the inspiration I got 
from the work and conversations with Finn Brunton and his aliens, waving to 
us through his text if one squints a little. Special thanks then go out to Paula 
Bialski, Goetz Bachmann, and Boris Traue for their thoughtful, informed, and 
thorough editorial reading of the manuscript, which improved it significantly. 
And thanks to the gifted Robert Ochshorn for sharing my serious interest in 
interfaces. Finally, I thank Michael Dieter and David Berry, whose invitation 
to contribute to their 2015 reader Postdigital Aesthetics: Art, Computation and 
Design (2015) gave me a first chance to grasp the idea of infantilization of digital 
interfaces. I am still surprised to find them sharing my perspective, the first 
time I presented it, which was the start that allowed me to build on it.
1 Understanding technology as a subject seems to be a projection linked to 
Finn Brunton’s observation that human communication with aliens in space is 
imagined along the lines of a nonhuman agency with which we are familiar.
2 The analysis did not count individuals. Every time a new or a different sequence 
was introduced, it looked if the focus was on “adult” or “child,” whereby groups 
counted the same as individuals. Three scenes were mixed. When the child 
plays football surrounded by a group of adults, the focus is mainly on the child 
(counted as child). The child birth in the surgery theater shows first adults at 
work; from there the camera moves to the child who was just born (counted as 
adult and child). The last scene shows Steve Gleason looking at the son on his 
lap (counted as adult and child).
3 Interestingly, Barad’s strong focus on “interference” observed in the phenom-
enon of diffraction is somewhat close to Gilbert Simondon’s approach, whose 
focus on the “ensemble” of technology and human— their interference— was 
discussed by describing the “technical reality” as one (Simondon 2017, 53). It 
has often been said (e.g., Combes 2013, 57) that Simondon’s description of 
technology as an interference is informed by his concept of “individuation,” 
which describes the process that produces an individual, although this individ-
ual is only a temporary instability— a theory he develops among others inspired 
by quantum and wave mechanics (Simondon 1992, 304), much like Barad. 
Therefore it comes as no surprise that Barad, with a doctorate in quantum 
physics, starts her point of departure— the preface of her book— from a very 
similar point of view. She writes, “Individuals do not preexist their interactions; 
rather, individuals emerge through and as part of their entangled intra- 
relating.” Furthermore, she points out, “existence is not an individual affair” 
(Barad 2007, ix).
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Code	Review	as	
Communication:	 
The	Case	of	Corporate	
Software	Developers
Paula Bialski
Communication is a rich tangle of intellectual and cultural strands that 
encodes our time’s confrontations with itself. To understand commu-
nication is to understand much more.
— John Durham Peters
In early August 2017, a Google employee published an internal 
memo titled “Google’s Ideological Echo Chamber.” Most of us recall 
the content of the memo as well as the buzz that it stirred in tech 
circles in Silicon Valley and beyond: the memo outlined the reasons 
that Google’s diversity initiative was fundamentally wrong. One 
section in particular struck me— an ethnographer of corporate 
software developers— as particularly misleading: “as Google was 
trying to make software engineering more people- oriented with 
pair programming and more collaboration,” Google’s initiative was 
fundamentally limited by “how people- oriented certain roles and 
Google can be” (Motherboard, August 8, 2017). One of the memo’s 
94 messages was to “deemphasize empathy” in tech companies. As 
far as software developers are concerned, who needs empathy 
anyway when building technical systems?
While I acknowledge that this memo stirred up a lengthy debate 
around gender biases in the tech industry, about what women are 
good and not good at, and about the general differences between 
men and women in the first place, I will, for the purpose of staying 
on topic, leave out this debate and focus on one of the article’s 
claims: that communication and empathy should not be stressed 
as assets among tech workers.
Communication in digital cultures is multifaceted. We know that it 
can exist between humans, mediated by digital technologies. It can 
occur between a human and machines (the way we record our voic-
es or type into a screen). It can exist machine to machine (the way 
Finn Brunton so eloquently underlined in chapter 1 of this volume).
What the author of the Google memo overlooked was that soft-
ware is perhaps one of the most complex examples where digital 
media and human sociality indeed intertwine. Human empathy in 
a team meeting sits alongside merging pieces of code written by 
separate people. In this chapter, I would like to zoom in on the pro-
cesses of a large- scale software development corporation to uncov-
er the way in which human– machine cohabitation and co- creation 
call on various modes of communication. In previous chapters, 
Brunton explored communication and digital technology through 
questioning the alienlike dialogue between technical entities— 
focusing more on communication between machines— and Bunz 
looked at the way in which these technical entities are designed 
to address us, the user, and what kind of effect this type of design 
(childlike and patronizing) has on us. This chapter will draw you, the 
reader, into an ethnographic field to see the way communication 
between machines, between humans and machines, and between 
humans building machines plays out. Doing so, I hope, will give you 
a grounded example of the multifaceted nature of communication 
in digital cultures.
95Charlie
I met Charlie about two years ago during one of Noah’s film nights 
in Berlin’s Neukolln district. We were all sitting on Noah’s living 
room couch and discussing their software company— a place 
where I later started conducting my long- term fieldwork project. 
The company focused on building mapping and navigation soft-
ware and had approximately six thousand employees. One thou-
sand of them were software developers of all shapes and sizes. I 
worked with Charlie on the “navigation” team, which worked on, 
among other things, how to find the best route from A to B (which 
is a much tougher problem than it sounds).
I just assumed Charlie was a developer. And he played the part. He 
spoke knowledgeably about code, bugs, breakdowns, and updates, 
and I somehow just jumped to the conclusion that he knew a lot 
about programming. It was only in the recent weeks, when I started 
working in his department, that I noticed something fishy. During 
a product owner1 meeting, he was there. Sitting at the table. He 
was very engaged in the meeting, very vocal, very un- developer- 
like. I first figured that he was a lead developer, or somebody just 
keen enough to sit at the product owner meetings, until I realized 
that he was, in fact, a product owner. This mix- up— the fact that 
I didn’t know what an employee was doing exactly— was quite a 
common mix- up, even for any regular employee. This was due 
to the fluidity of both his role (he himself didn’t know if he was a 
product manager, product owner, error manager, or a number 
of other possible positions) and the amount of technical knowl-
edge he had (his knowledge of the software system they were 
building was somewhere in the gray zone of being technical and 
not- so- technical- at- all).
Charlie had the poshest of English accents. This accent would sur-
prise me every time he opened his mouth. Perhaps it was because 
this software development company hires a mishmash of national-
ities, creating a sort of Globish clang around the office. To overhear 
a real native English speaker was quite odd. And the type of English 
96 he spoke was a Merry Poppins sort of English, using sentences like 
“I’m just taking care of some bits and bobs” and “we’re far away 
from everything being tickety boo.” Despite the fact that he looked 
cheery all the time, Charlie always explained that he was stressed 
and that there was a lot of work on his shoulders.
Charlie was also very understanding of my role as an ethnographer 
and spoke to me softly and with true interest in what I do. That 
afternoon, after I asked him a few times about the “fire” he was 
trying to put out, he offered to show me what he was working 
on. He grabbed a coffee cup and his laptop, and we walked over 
to the common area near the staircase, with nice wooden picnic 
tables. He opened up his laptop to show a screen of software 
called Gerrit— a free, open source, web- based code collaboration 
tool.2 Gerrit displayed a list of merges— meaning updates or 
additions to the code base. This list included the type of update, 
who updated it, and the status of the update (whether it passed or 
failed). During merging, the code would get automatically tested, 
and various problems could arise. I learned that it was his job as 
error manager (an additional job he was assigned to do, on top 
of his product owner job) to monitor these updates, especially 
during the last week of production. That day was feature complete 
day— which meant that all features or changes to the new software 
version should be finished and merged into the code base. Merging 
doesn’t happen seamlessly. Charlie anticipated that something 
wrong would happen and, during days like these, always kept his 
computer open and monitored the progress of each merge.
Looking over his laptop, he started pointing at a list of bars colored 
red and light blue, delineating the status of the merge process. 
Each of these bars was one “piece” of code belonging to one 
developer who pushed this code into the rest of the build. The 
bars would change color depending on whether the code merged, 
or worked, with the rest of the code. I looked at one of the bars 
that turned red and said “merge error,” and I asked him, “So is it 
kind of like putting two pieces of a puzzle together, but one person 
chopped off one arm of the puzzle piece, so it doesn’t fit into the 
other piece as it was intended to?”
97Charlie explained, “You have to imagine that there is a Google  
Doc that two people are working on. And at the same time, one  
editor makes changes to what the other editor was working on. 
When they merge these two documents, their changes would 
conflict.”
Charlie explained that this is called a merge conflict— when a 
change, or job, that one developer merges influences another line 
of code that another developer merged. We were both looking 
intently at the screen at a long list of around fifteen jobs, some of 
them with “merge conflict” marked next to them. Throughout the 
next fifteen minutes of sitting there together, I could see him moni-
toring this screen intently. He explained that each time a developer 
wants to merge what he or she was working on into the main 
repository, it would take around forty minutes for the server to test 
the merged code. In monitoring this screen, Charlie was waiting for 
a developer, and the server, and the code base to communicate 
something to the rest of the team (including him) regarding the 
status of the code. And there were also other conflicts that could 
arise aside from merge conflicts.
I noticed myself starting to get a small sense of how programmers 
worked together. And the way they worked together was through 
various forms of communication, avoidance of communication, or 
analyzing communication. The term communication was constantly 
floating around the office. If we take Charlie as an example, just 
these few minutes of interacting with him displayed all the verbal, 
nonverbal, machine- based, human– machine, or team- based 
communication that takes place in a software development setting. 
Charlie’s type of English compared to the English of his colleagues 
posed a communication issue. The way Charlie’s client expressed 
what they needed Charlie’s feature to do for the user posed a com-
munication issue. The way one developer’s code communicated 
to the code base posed a communication issue. The various ways 
two developers worked on the same piece of software posed a 
communication issue.
98 Moments	of	Unfolding
The question of how digital media technology affects the social 
and how the social affects digital media technologies can best be 
studied in such hard- to- grasp, always slippery, always changing 
moments of unfolding. My goal with this initial fieldwork anecdote 
was to briefly introduce you to the highly complex feat of com-
munication that software development entails. Mixed in between 
servers; shyness; Globish; and software standards, testing stan-
dards, and customer expectations are people collaborating on the 
same project. This collaboration consists of a deep intermingling of 
human and machine. As Mercedes Bunz pointed out in her chapter 
in this volume, digital communication needed to be conceptualized 
on more than one layer, because software operates always with 
more than one interface. These interfaces are between machine 
and machine and between machine and user. As I will point out, 
there is also another layer, that between the writers of code (soft-
ware developers) and other software developers. The overarching 
goal in this chapter is to speak to the issue of communication 
in digital cultures, by providing a rather descriptive map of the 
forms of communication that occur in corporate programming 
environments. In doing so, I aim to explain exactly how software 
development is organized as a practice and how communication 
fits into this practice. This communication that I will unfold includes 
a number of objects and people. This communication takes place
 1. machine to machine
 2. programmer to machine
 3. programmer to organization
 4. programmer to programmer
As part of a constant assemblage of human and machine, these 
three sides— organization, producers, and the material resistance 
of software— interact with one another in iterative processes, 
shaping together digital media, which are never not just filters but, 
in John Durham Peters’s (2015, 2) words, “vehicles that carry and 
communicate meaning.” The methodological challenge is then in 
99understanding how all these pieces communicate with each other 
and to observe such relations in moments of their unfolding.
In this chapter, I mainly draw on the ethnographic data I collected 
during my ongoing research of corporate software developers. In 
August 2016, I began an organizational ethnography at a large, six- 
thousand- employee Berlin- based software company, BerlinTech. At 
the time this chapter was published, I had spent more than eighty 
working days immersed in this company— attending meetings, 
observing the developers develop software, and holding both 
formal and informal interviews in the office kitchens, over lunch, 
or during long walks to and from work. My general focus within my 
research is to uncover technologically mediated sociality. I frame 
my research within cultural, social and media theory, science and 
technology studies, software studies, infrastructure studies, and 
the ethnography of software developers.
As I mentioned in a previous paragraph, this company makes key 
mapping infrastructure for third parties such as social networking 
sites or various apps in need of embedded maps. I spent two 
months among front- end app developers who built the company’s 
“consumer” product— meaning the app that users download 
for use on their smartphones and desktops— and am currently situ-
ated among the back- end developers who build in- car navigation 
systems and maintain the routing infrastructure. The larger moti-
vation behind my ethnographic project stems out of the belief that 
studying the mundane, quite “average” software developer brings 
us closer to the way in which our digital infrastructures work. To 
study everyday software developers— the masses of engineers who 
build the infrastructures that power our mobility, our sociality, our 
consumption (the list goes on)— is to study of how communication 
between humans and machines functions, and is changing, in our 
everyday, digitally networked lives. 
In this chapter, I attempt to unpack how developers communicate 
with one another, and how machines communicate to developers, 
as well as the imperfect tools (such as the code review software) 
100 that are invented to assist the communication between machines 
(code to code).
This research aims for (1) an ethnographically rich understanding 
of digital sociality that (2) focuses on moments of unfolding; (3) is 
based on a trimodal way of communicating between developers, 
the code they build, and the software they use to communicate 
with; and (4) last, but not least, looks at the interrelations between 
these three sides. I am aware, of course, that my field has other 
sites where communication takes place, especially between 
designers, management, and users. Programmers use a variety 
of collaborative management tools that are designed specifically 
for developers themselves (such as code review systems and 
workflow systems) or for the labor force at large (such as electronic 
calendars, intranet systems, and online spreadsheets). For the sake 
of this topic, I narrow down our case study of developer commu-
nication to one tool, Gerrit, that strictly relates to a practice called 
code review.
Despite ethnographies that look at the intricate ways in which 
programmers collaborate, an ethnographic mapping of program-
ming practices in corporations in relation to the notion of commu-
nication has not been done. Many of these topics have also been 
addressed extensively in software engineering literature, but not 
from an ethnographic angle.
Describing	Gerrit
After two months of working in the field, my field diaries left me 
with lingering questions. The luck of my field was that my infor-
mants weren’t an isolated tribe, cut off from the rest of the world, 
but were software developers, who, as you could imagine, were 
often sitting in front of their computers, often with their various 
chat systems (Skype, Spark, or Slack) open, instantly accessible. 
This provided me with a sort of never- ending feeling of field 
access— as if I had a lifeline to my field that hardly ended after I  
left the office.
101That being said, this chapter is made up of a variety of pieces 
of data I collected throughout a two- year period: a number of 
field notes before I entered the field, notes collected during my 
fieldwork, and more recent online exchanges with my informants 
over various chat applications.
The conversation between Charlie and me illustrated the basics 
of a code review system: it is based on a culture of peer review. 
The team of one hundred developers I currently research creates 
routing infrastructure for navigation systems (so how the fastest or 
most optimal route from A to B is calculated). These developers are 
then split up into subteams. The team I directly sit with is the elec-
tric vehicle (EV) team, comprising five developers. They collectively 
have to solve a routing problem typical for EVs: how to optimize a 
driving route for a car that has to secure charging stations every 
few hours? Before their project is finalized and is implemented 
into an in- vehicle system, their work is split into small subtasks. 
Before the project starts (the project’s sprint period), the group of 
developers sit together in a room with their manager, or product 
owner, and define the subtasks that need to be done to complete 
the project. These subtasks are called tickets. Then, the next day, 
each developer takes a ticket and starts working on it. A ticket, in 
the case of the EV team, could be, for example, to match the library 
for EV charging stations to a route library. Maria would then take 
this ticket, work on it, and then upload it or “push” it to the Gerrit 
code review system for review. Her colleagues would then give 
her a score between +2 and −2 (the exact meaning of which I shall 
explain later).
Noah, one of my main informants, explained that the main pur-
pose of the code review3 was to collectively monitor if each line of 
code that a developer tries to upload into his team’s main reposi-
tory actually fits, and will work, with the code that the other team 
members have created. There are two main threads of communi-
cation at play here: the communication between developers, both 
offline (e.g., developers often peek over their desktop screens and 
yell out to a colleague, “Can you review my code please?” or “Hey, 
102 why did you give me a −1!”) and via their code review software (i.e., 
in the form of a code review), and the communication that lies 
between the technical system itself, for example, Noah’s lines of 
code have to speak to another developer’s lines of code, and these 
collections of lines have to speak to one another, so to speak, when 
running within the entire system. While I will get into more detail 
in a later section, I just want to underline that in this process, com-
munication in the right way, using the right syntax, for example, is 
highly necessary.
After being a year in this field (with only latent knowledge of how 
software is built), I have come to the understanding that code re-
view systems are an inherent part of a corporate software environ-
ment— a crucial part of a sort of production pipeline. It is necessary 
because a software product has to be shipped to its users within a 
certain time frame for the software company to remain competitive 
on the market, and that shipment has to actually work, without 
major bugs or breakdowns. Large- scale corporate software environ-
ments, made up of teams of dozens of developers, also need core 
review systems to make collaboration (and communication) with 
a large number of software updates easier. Michael, a developer 
who used to work at BerlinTech and who has since moved to a 
small start- up company, explained that the code review system at 
BerlinTech is a good example of how a big company deals with the 
review process. After moving jobs, Michael and his team of two 
to three people don’t have a review process, but rather, the team 
communicates with one another by talking before starting their job, 
agreeing on something, and cooperating throughout the develop-
ment process. Merging a change into the whole system becomes 
more of a formality in his case, rather than a necessity.
In noncorporate contexts, where software developers work on a 
small team without a strict deadline, they might use an informal 
code review system— giving each other feedback much like a band 
of musicians would give each other tips and tricks on how to make 
a song better. But a code review system in a corporate, large- scale 
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sembly line. Additionally, the code review system is a way of moni-
toring the code that goes into building a system but also becomes 
a surveillance tool for upper management to monitor what type of 
work the programmers are actually doing. And as I shall explain in 
a later section of this chapter, it also becomes a sousveillance tool 
for programmers to monitor other programmers.
At BerlinTech, Gerrit is only one of many code review systems in 
use among software developers. The company itself has more 
than one thousand developers, and communication between 
developers happens in a number of ways, including through code 
review systems, but also in face- to- face, daily, fifteen- minute 
standup meetings; at lunchtime; at other collaboration meetings; 
and via all sorts of internal (meaning set up by the company for 
office use only) and external (meaning set up by team members 
for office use and other issues) platforms. Some (and this list is in 
no way exhaustive) include the company’s internal chat system, 
called Yammer (which is limited for social interaction), which is the 
company’s “official” internal communication tool for all work- 
related issues, and collaboration software like Cisco Spark, Slack, or 
even Skype chat. Each team, depending on what they are building, 
has a different type of communication tool, and even a different 
type of code review system. Keeping track of these channels of 
communication was a dizzying and oftentimes frustrating task 
for the developers with whom I worked. Some collaboration tools 
emerge bottom- up, initiated by the collaborators themselves, and 
some collaboration tools were initiated top- down, by the manage-
ment of the company. While the ways in which sociality emerges in 
these meetings— in specific working groups or on each individual 
platform, with their specificities and power politics— are relevant 
to the theme of communication here, I will refrain from addressing 
them for the sake of keeping a more narrow focus on code review 
tools and the communication inherent within them.
Returning to Gerrit, this is a code review system that is free and 
open source, originally authored by Google— and it is not the only 
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many different teams use different code review systems is “most- 
ly because not everybody completed the transition to Gerrit.  
Some people prefer other ways, because their project is small, or 
they’re not aware of Gerrit, or they just don’t like it” (field notes, 
June 2017).
Simon, one team leader, explained to me, “Gerrit is a key part of 
our culture. If a developer has a piece of code, he uploads it to Ger-
rit. You collaborate together to make one commit happen. This is 
not like competition for making code. It is trying to work together. 
Trying to transfer information and knowledge” (field notes, August 
2016).
Sebastian, another iOS developer (building the application for 
iPhones), uses the metaphor of a tree to explain how code review 
works: “It’s like a tree and every coder adds another branch to that 
tree. In order to merge their changes (branches), there has to be 
certain tests done. Only after these tests can the branches be really 
incorporated as part of this tree” (field notes, August 2016).
Using Sebastian’s metaphor, when a programmer adds a “branch” 
to Gerrit, it is visible to other developers, and the code waits for 
at least two developers— plus an automated bot— to approve the 
code. At BerlinTech’s front- end team, developers were encouraged 
to look at an incoming review every one to two hours, although 
one developer informed me that this rule “often didn’t happen 
anyways, but a review of your work did take place every twenty- 
four hours” (field notes, June 2017). A review in the Gerrit system 
has five variables:
−2: Do not submit
−1: I would prefer that you didn’t submit this
0: No score
+1: Looks good to me, but someone else must approve
+2: Looks good to me, approved
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days, when he feels like leaving work and running off for a beer, he 
would quickly go through the code review system and just add “+2, 
+2, +2” to all the tickets waiting to be reviewed (field notes, August 
2016). How much of this is actually true is a mystery, but it alludes 
to the way in which variables such as fatigue, the weather, the time 
of day, and the relationships between the developers themselves 
factor into their ratings.
Communication Models
At this point you, the reader, are perhaps beginning to understand 
the general purpose of a code review system and some basics 
of how Gerrit functions. If we unpack how communication works 
within this system, we can start to see three communication mod-
els at play. First, the code review system mediates communication 
between people, in this case, programmers working on code. This 
type of model of communication is between two humans and is 
dialogic and interactive. In the case of Gerrit, developers review 
one another based on a culture of reciprocity: if somebody has 
reviewed your code, you are obliged to review her code in return. 
If a developer requests a code review and then, upon gaining a 
review, refuses to reciprocate and review code in the future, this 
behavior is viewed as antisocial. Moreover, code review is also 
done in conversation. For example, a developer might write, “To be 
honest, this whole solution looks a bit . . . hacky. Could you please 
describe how it works and why this is a correct solution?”4 This 
developer will not approve the “committer’s” (programmer submit-
ting a code update/solution to be reviewed) code until he gains an 
answer to his question. Code review is a continuous back- and- forth 
between committer and reviewer and must reach a level of mutual 
understanding.
Additionally, it might not come as a surprise that interaction 
between two developers is often easier through a system like 
Gerrit, minimizing the social pressure of face- to- face interaction. 
Michal recalled a situation where “there was one review that had 
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between two guys. And as I see it, it would be way easier for them 
to chat (one was working remotely) and decide on a solution and 
then just fix it with one patch. But they were both pretty introvert-
ed so I’m guessing they ‘preferred’ to handle it through Gerrit” (field 
notes, July 2017).
As Peters (1999, 23) has noted, this model of communication is 
also sometimes defined by “open and frank talk between intimates 
or coworkers. Here communication does not mean simply talk; 
it refers to a special kind of talk distinguished by intimacy and 
disclosure.” Michael also added that in the best iteration of com-
munication during code review, the two developers share a sort of 
“respect”: when the reviewer asks questions about the solution, the 
committer attempts to answer them and fix the problems that the 
reviewer mentioned (field notes, June 2017). This respect can form 
an intimacy between two developers, where two developers form a 
sort of rapport through their code review process.
Communication in this case is thus reciprocal, takes place between 
two developers, and involves explicit discussion and questions 
that one developer directs toward another. The rating system I 
mentioned in an earlier section (+2, +1, 0, −1, −2) is also part of a 
more implicit communication system between developers, and 
each developer might give his own subjective understanding of 
what each score means without explicitly describing this meaning 
to the other developer. This type of communication also can mean 
a sense of “transfer or transmission . . . of ideas, thoughts, or 
meanings” (Peters 1999, 15).
I asked Michael, “OK, so let me get this straight. I can’t give Mike a 
+2 if a little piece of his code is wrong, so then I comment on a code 
block, and then Mike patches it, and its still wrong, so I comment 
again?” Michael responded by stating,
Well you can— it depends on the reviewer style; my style 
was, “I can give you +2 even if something is a bit wrong, 
as long as I will highlight it and you will fix it in the future,” 
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other person a better programmer for the future. But I 
know some asshole reviewers who would see a very small 
bad piece of code . . . for instance, a variable name they 
didn’t agree with, because it wasn’t descriptive enough, 
and they would give the committer −1 and tell them to 
fix it. I would in that case give them +2 and say “make 
the variable more descriptive in the future” . . . but I can 
imagine the other side would say “I care about the code-
base and I’m strict with reviews, but some other people 
[like Michael] allow bad code to go through and assume 
that people will fix it.” And a “lazy reviewer” I’m assuming 
would give a −2 to code without explaining what’s wrong. 
(field notes, June 2017)
In this example, Gerrit’s rating system takes on different standards 
for different developers. Where the so- called asshole developer 
gives a −1 to a developer who forgets to provide enough descrip-
tion of a variable, Michael chooses to waive this lack of description 
for the benefit of encouraging the developer to work on it next 
time. Technical standards take on different meanings in practice, 
and developers who understand the meaning of what Michael is 
communicating with his +2 will be all the more annoyed or sur-
prised when they receive a −1 from him.
Broadcasting
The second model is the broadcast model of communication: rath-
er than being a reciprocal exchange between dyads, code review 
becomes a one- to- many performative act. The developer’s review 
itself broadcasts meaning to a group of (often) unspecified others.
For instance, Gerrit functions in such a way that each review is 
tagged with the name of the reviewer. At BerlinTech, one devel-
opment team I was working on was expected to conduct at least 
two reviews per hour. While this standard was not kept up, some 
developers would just engage in code review to keep up their 
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comment nor the rating of the code review itself was important. 
Rather, the mere gesture communicated to others “I am reviewing, 
thus I am part of this team.” If Noah, for example, conducted a 
review, he was communicating to his fellow developers, as well as 
to his supervisor, that he is indeed a team player and does care 
about the quality of the team’s project.
On the other hand, I observed that some developers found code 
review to be part of their procrastination regime, as it was easy and 
“mindless.” Engaging in code review would help communicate to 
their team as well as their boss that they were engaged and work-
ing, while in practice, they were merely conducting this “mindless” 
work to avoid their more challenging job. The reviewer is thus not 
engaged in a meaningful dialogue with the committer but is rather 
clicking through the reviews quickly and mindlessly.
As I also mentioned earlier, code review becomes a surveillance 
tool for upper management to monitor what type of work the 
programmers are actually doing. Gerrit is designed in such a way 
that makes work highly transparent to anyone in the company, in-
cluding management. It also becomes a sousveillance tool— a way 
for colleagues to implicitly monitor one another’s work. The mere 
online presence of a manager within the Gerrit system, as well as 
the mere presence of a colleague, broadcasts or communicates to 
other developers “I am here, and I am watching you.”
Communicating Code
A third form of communication present within a code review 
system is communication between pieces of code, which are essen-
tially lists of commands or solutions that communicate meaning to 
a machine of other commands or solutions. Code can be seen as a 
sort of agent, commanding the computer’s performance.
My previous two definitions of communication involved human 
communication. But in the case of code review, code has to speak 
to other code for it to function. Peters (1999) noted that while 
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some sort of reciprocity, these factors do not have to take place 
between humans: “Communication can mean something like the 
successful linkage of two separate termini, as they say in telegra-
phy. Here simply getting through, as in delivery of mail or e- mail, is 
enough to constitute communication” (16). In this book, my fellow 
author Finn Brunton eloquently analyzes Claude Shannon when 
discussing this type of communication between machines.
To illustrate how this functions in a code review system, take a look 
at a snippet of conversation between a team of developers who 
are discussing a small functionality failure in a feature they are 
developing for a website. This conversation was cut from a Skype 
conversation they were having (as mentioned, developers often 
discuss their issues using various chat systems):
nina: There is one failure, which I think not caused by 
you, @John— “Scenario: Clicking on map markers and PDC 
links” . . . when I check in the commit of Michal I still see 
it failing.
john: well, the current run is my submit. Let’s see what is 
left after that, but yea, worth taking a look at as well
nina: @Piotr, I see that the step “And I expand the place 
panel contents if not expanded” which you added. I 
wonder if the change you did is the reason of failure of 
“Scenario: Clicking on map markers and PDC links.”
In this instance, John submitted a change (often called a commit or 
a submit) to the functionality of a side panel that is affecting various 
links and markers on a map on their website. In this instance, the 
code in John’s commit is not communicating to the code in Piotr’s 
submit. Perhaps this code has a syntax error— which could mean 
that the line of code is not merging or communicating with the 
other code through this error. Unlike humans, who can infer mean-
ing even when something is mumbled or slurred, or when a word is 
spoken in a different language, when various parts of one machine 
speak to one another through code, this code has to be written 
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the code review process is for humans (programmers) to assist 
machines (various parts of an app build) in their communication 
process.
Code communicates to other code through these processes of 
merging. Maria, the back- end developer I mentioned previously, 
explained the way in which code interacts, by stating, “Yes, we 
are constantly breaking each other’s stuff. What you are creating 
communicates with other code others are building. And we are all 
doing it at the same time. Its like building a house. When building a 
house, the plumber works on something, and then the carpenter. 
Often this doesn’t happen at the same time, because their work 
would conflict with one other. But we do work on stuff at the same 
time. And it does conflict.”
One can imagine a sort of Tower of Babel, with code communi-
cating to other layers of code. Although each line of code, or each 
commit, can be traced back to the author who created it, code has 
to communicate with other code even when developers are away, 
on vacation, or asleep. This communication brings the machine (in 
the case of my developers, a routing engine) to life.
Technical systems are incredibly social. A code review system, 
based on something that should be seemingly mechanic, is a highly 
variable communicative process both because of its technical 
limitations and also because of the culture of communication that 
develops in the setting in which it is situated.
Understanding how developers communicate to one another 
through a code review system can reveal how a technical system 
structures cooperation, how standards of communication develop, 
and the idiosyncrasies of human– human as well as human– 
machine communication. It can help us understand how digital 
media at large impacts communication. Understanding how 
producers and designers of technology create their products can 
reveal the cultural, political, and economic motives that structure 
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material resistance and viscosity of software, its bugs, breakdowns, 
and technical dependencies, helps us to understand some of the 
properties of digital media technology itself.
This chapter has focused on one case study: the code review 
process among corporate software developers. I did so to under-
stand the various nuances and forms that communication in digital 
cultures can take. Although my communication models were in no 
way exhaustive here, I focused on “communication as interaction” 
between programmer and programmer, “communication as 
broadcast” between programmer and the rest of the organization, 
and “communication between code” as the way in which code is 
seen as an interactive process between other code. This analysis, 
I hope, brought you, the reader, closer to imagining the communi-
cative interrelationship between machines (compilers, databases, 
processors, memory, servers, clouds), (2) programmers, and (3) the 
infrastructure within which both programmers and machines 
function.
Notes
1 Those less technical members of a development team who held the developers 
responsible to the customer and the product they were creating.
2 See http://www.gerritcodereview.com/.
3 As one of my informants clarified, the code review has many unofficial roles as 
well, in building shared coding practices, initiating junior developers, building 
a shared view of the team on how code should look, elucidating which part of 
code they are putting emphasis on as a group— style, efficiency, testability, and 
so on. In less collaborative teams, one can see how code review creates con-
flicts that should have resolved prior to coding.
4 https://github.com/facebook/react-native/pull/14259.
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Machine communication—to interact not just 
via but also with machines—has transformed 
contemporary communication. It puts us not 
just in conversation with one another but also 
with our current machinery. By analyzing the 
alienness of this computational communication, 
through a close reading of interfaces and a field 
study of software development, this volume 
uncovers what it means to “communicate” 
today. 
“How are humans shaped by machine communication? Anyone 
wanting to think through this complex and crucial question 
needs to read this book, which offers a strikingly innovative, 
multifaceted, and concentrated analysis of the problem of com-
munication in our present moment.” — Rita Raley, University of 
California, Santa Barbara
“Using diverse methodological approaches and points of interest, 
this book invites us to rethink what, if anything, the concept of 
communication can mean in a moment when neither embodied 
minds nor clearly demarcated individuals are the subjects of the 
drama.” — John Durham Peters, Yale University
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